FROM PLOTINUS TO S. THOMAS AQUINAS

BEING STUDIES IN THE LATER PHASES OF THE TRADITION . . OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY .

BY

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PUBLISHED IN LONDON BY THE FAITH PRESS, LTD., AT THE FAITH HOUSE, 22, BUCKINGHAM STREET, CHARING CROSS, W.C. 2.

TO THE DEAR MEMORY

OF MY FRIEND ARTHUR BOUTWOOD

("HAKLUYT EGERTON"),

WITHOUT WHOSE HELP THESE CHAPTERS

COULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN.

Made and Printed in Great Britain.

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PREFACE

The Chapters brought together in this book were written at different times over a considerable period of years. They represent the substance of papers read at various private gatherings where a few friends used to meet who were interested in the history of human thought and its successive phases. It is for those who have a similar interest that they are now published, not, that is to say, for professed philosophers or historians of philosophy, who would of course require a much fuller treatment of the topics discussed but for persons of ordinary education who desire a little closer acquaintance with certain names and periods. Nor is there any pretension of original research in the pages which follow, but a short bibliography, including only such books as have been actually used in the preparation of the various chapters, has been added so that the reader may see where to look if he should desire further and fuller information.

The Greek tradition on any reckoning forms a notable stage in the evolution of human culture and its effects are still to-day everywhere about us. It is eminently worthy of study, not indeed (in any of its various forms) as a philosophy to which we can go for answers to the problems and perplexities of our time, but rather as a province of the "archæology of thought," to quote an expression used by an eminent authority on mediæval philosophy at a recent meeting of the Aristotelian Society. As such it is a study necessary for any who want to know the origin and source of most of the mental furniture of the modern world. In treating this side of his subject the author has been led unwillingly but unavoidably into somewhat controversial ground in view of an attempt to present a notable phase of the

Greek tradition as a living answer to modern difficulties. This is in his opinion impossible and from the specially religious and theological point of view it seems a grave error to tie the defence of the Christian Faith to a particular system, based, as all metaphysical systems must be, on the special level of the various sciences of a particular epoch.

For the transliteration of the few Greek phrases which have been quoted in this book, it has been, with some hesitation, decided to adopt (à peu près) the system employed by Dr. Rudolf Otto in his great work "Das Heilige."

W.R.V.B.

London,
February, 1926.

CHAPTER I.

SOME LATER PHASES OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

The student of classical literature who, having read no author later than Pliny, should cast a cursory glance into the writings of the philosophers of the third and fourth centuries of our era would find much to surprise him. Although the language is still Greek or Latin, he would find a subtle difference, a baleful cult of rhetoric has to some extent obscured classical clearness of expression and the spirit of ancient Greece and Rome, in its freshness and its freedom, is almost entirely absent. The grace and beauty of Plato's style have vanished with the Greek joy of life. Thought tends to hide itself in language no longer the vehicle of its accurate expression.

The classical student, moreover, generally associates with philosophers and philosophy a certain contempt, or at least disregard of the ordinary religion of the state. It was, of course, one of the two charges brought against Socrates that "he did not worship the gods which the city worshipped" and, indeed, in spite of the edifying story in the "Phaedo" that his last words related to the performance of a sacrifice due to Asclepius, there was much force in the accusation. The philosophers as a body were distinctly in opposition as regards the religious beliefs of their countrymen—just as their pupil, Euripides, never tires of holding up to scorn and ridicule some of the most venerable of the pagan myths. It is to be remembered that Plato, surely the most religious of the Greek philosophers, in the fullest and serenest statement of his metaphysical belief, in the "Republic," gives no very explicit or conspicuous place to God or the gods. The centre of his system, the "Idea of the Good," is conceived as impersonal and the

concepts of worship and reverence do not connect themselves very naturally with it. The same is true of classical Latin literature also. Indeed Roman philosophy is most conspicuously represented to the classical student by the great poem of Lucretius, "De Rerum Natura," an account in sombre but gorgeous verse of the materialistic system of Epicurus. We all remember how this great poem opens, how it celebrates the enlightening influence of the Greek sage whereunder "religion is put under foot and trampled upon in turn." Let us quote the passage, his warning to his reader and his justification: "this is what I fear herein lest haply you should fancy that you are entering upon unholy grounds of reason and treading the path of sin, whereas on the contrary often and often that very religion has given birth to sinful and unholy deeds. Thus in Aulis," he goes on, "the chosen chieftains of the Danai, foremost of men, foully polluted with Iphianassa's blood the altar of the Trivian maid. Soon as the fillet encircling her maiden tresses shed itself in equal lengths adown each cheek and soon as she saw her father standing sorrowful before the altars and beside him the ministering priests hiding the knife and her countrymen at sight of her shedding tears, speechless in terror she dropped down on her knees and sank to the ground. Nor aught in such a moment could it avail the luckless girl that she had first bestowed the name of father on the king. For lifted up in the hands of the men she was carried shivering to the altars, not after due performance of the customary rites to be escorted by the clear-ringing bridal song, but in the very season of marriage, stainless maid amid the stain of blood, to fall a sad victim to the sacrificing stroke of a father, that thus a happy and prosperous departure might be granted to the fleet. So great the evils to which religion could prompt!"—"Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum."[1]

[1] Lucretius, 1, 11, 80—101. Munro's translation.

To demonstrate the change that had come over the world three hundred years after Lucretius wrote, let us turn to Porphyry, one of the most famous logicians of the third century, A.D. (born 232, died 304). In a fragment, preserved by Eusebius, he speaks thus of a collection of oracles which he is editing: "I call the gods to witness," he says, "that I have added nought, nor taken away anything from the sense of the oracles . . . I have preserved them pure and uncontaminated, taking care to avoid the impiety of tampering with them as deserving a greater penalty than the spoliation of a temple. In the present collection will be found a record of many of the opinions received in philosophy where the gods have pronounced them consonant with truth. In some degree also we shall touch upon the general study of divination in so far as that science is helpful for philosophical speculation or for the general purification of life. But the advantages of our collection will be most apparent to those who, struggling to bring truth to birth, have uttered the prayer that they might light upon its god-given manifestation and find a solution of their difficulties through the trustworthy teachings of the gods who speak therein . . . But these gracious gifts must only be imparted to those whose lives are set towards their souls' salvation."[2]

The change in spirit marked by such a passage as this came about, of course, by gradual stages. There were many contributing factors, among which we may notice that even before the end of the period which we call classical, philosophy had come by preference to choose ethical rather than metaphysical subjects. Pure metaphysics seems to have ended in scepticism and Pyrrhonism. In the new schools of the Stoics and Epicureans, metaphysics, though by no means absent, is strictly subordinated to ethics. The term

[2] Apud Eusebius, Prep. Evan. bk. 4. 7—8. (Migne, P.G. 21. col. 249.)

"philosopher" now begins to acquire the meaning of one who knows the art of bearing the evil things of life with becoming patience and resignation—a meaning the word has in certain passages of Shakespeare. This general standpoint was obviously favourable to religion and religious sentiment.[3] Again, another important point, which, however, should not be pressed unduly, is that the leadership of the new schools passed out of the hands of men of pure Greek descent into those of men whose Greek names had come to them as inhabitants of the vast regions of Asia Minor and the Orient hellenised through the conquests of Alexander. Zeno and Cleanthes, the Stoic founders, for example, were both Asiatics by birth. Once more, in Rome the early Empire had seen a serious attempt to reform and restore the native religion. The renewal of temples, the revival of old rites and the like are, of course, familiar topics in Horace and Virgil, albeit the individual poet might be like Horace an Epicurean, or even an atheist. The Augustan age did not re-echo in the matter of religion the tone of Cæsar or of Cicero. This revival was by no means without result, popular sentiment began to look upon a philosopher of Epicurean sympathies with distrust and suspicion. And then there was the gradual rise of Christianity, producing a crisis which forced philosophy and religion to come to terms.

But if philosophy had changed in the interval between Lucretius and Porphyry, still more striking had been the changes in the popular religion at which we must now shortly glance. It had indeed a most intimate connexion with the fortunes of philosophical thought in the period which we are now considering. The conquests of Alexander, the great wars of Rome and the vast empire inherited by the Cæsars had immeasurably widened the spiritual outlook of the

[3] "A kind of priest and minister of the gods," says M. Aurelius of the philosopher, bk. 3. c. 4. Cf. Inge, *Plotinus*, Vol. II., p. 164.

people of Greece and Italy. The mysterious deities of the East which had always exercised a fascination for the Hellenic and the Roman mind supplanted with astonishing rapidity the older native cults. From the contemplation of the crowd of Egyptian and Syrian gods and goddesses which flocked to the Pantheon, certain leading ideas began to suggest themselves to thoughtful minds. What if all these deities of such various origins and of such distant cities, were only many names for One Divine Nature? The road was thus thrown open to a certain type of monotheism. By the third century of our era the ground of religious thought was mainly occupied by two deities, two diverse yet complementary aspects of the One Divine; they were male and female, the male was the Unconquered Sun, the Persian Mithra whose shrines are to be found from Asia Minor to Britain. Marcus Aurelius installed him in the Vatican, where the basilica of S. Peter now stands. The female deity concurrently worshipped was the Great Mother, Astarte of the Syrians, Mylitta of Babylon. There does not seem to have been much theology inherited with these deities, though it might be fashionable to talk of Brahmins and Buddhists. It is, however, certain that the Religion of Israel exercised a considerable influence.

Mention of the Religion of Israel induces us to turn to consider very briefly a thinker of great originality and power, the Jew Philo, born a few years B.C. Dr. Harnack tells us that Philo's thought was a sort of historical anticipation of much that the later pagan philosophers had to say. To him, for example, is due the elaboration of the concept of Persons or Hypostases in the Divine Unity which played so great a part in Christian as well as in pagan teaching. Philo is unfortunately an unsystematic thinker and it is difficult or impossible to harmonise all the phases of his thought. At one time he will speak of the Divine Nature in terms that remind a modern reader

of the language of Hegelian idealism. Sometimes he maintains that God cannot be named, being above all human categories—just as centuries later was maintained by the Christian philosopher Scotus Eriugena. He tells us that to take literally that saying in Genesis (vi. 6) that "it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth" would be the greatest of impieties, thus anticipating Maimonides. In this mood he calls God, "ápoios," "sui generis" as we might say, not belonging to any class—God's true "hýparxis," His Being or Essence, ever remains concealed. He tells us, what we shall hear again from S. Thomas Aquinas, that God stands in no relation to the world. But there is an intermediary, the "Logos," the sum of all ideas or archetypes of things, "lógos genikótatos," as he phrases it. Consequently, "in order to comprehend God, we should first have to become God, which is impossible."[4]

In other moods Philo falls back into the more realistic, non-metaphysical language that we more generally associate with Jewish thought. The Logos, in whose image the soul of man has been created, is the Giver of Divine Light and in his atoning work for mankind whose rebellion has alienated the race from God, he is like the High Priest of the Mosaic Law. "I stand," Philo makes him say, "between the Lord and you, I who am neither uncreated like God nor created like you, but a mean between the

[4] See Erdmann, *History of Philosophy,* Eng. trans., Vol. I., p. 218, also passages quoted in Ritter and Preller, *His. Phil.* (§§ 505, 510 of the 4th Ed. 1869.) Also Inge, *Plotinus,* Vol. I., p. 97, Vol. II., p. 111. Mr. Leonard Hodgson in his *Place of Reason,* etc., and in his Lecture, "Has criticism destroyed the Bible?" has an interesting speculation that Philo was the first author of the demand for "a verbally inspired infallible revelation." But the idea that the Divine Nature is not knowable by man in Its Essence seems to me to be common to all the representatives of the traditional philosophy of the ancient world, and especially of the Christian Schools, cf. the "Pater immensus" of the "Quicunque."

two extremes, a hostage on either side."[5] Philo has also much to say about demons and angels, subjects everywhere much discussed in his day. By personifying God's qualities, "aretaí, dynámeis, exoysíai"—"virtues, potentialities, powers"—Philo made room, says Erdmann, not only for hellenising Jews but for orientalising Greeks.[6] He has also something to say about vision or ecstasy. On this subject he speaks in a singularly clear and temperate manner. The following passage is an example: "I will not be ashamed to relate what has happened to myself a thousand times. Often when I have come to write out the doctrines of philosophy, though I well knew what I ought to say, I have found my mind dry and barren, and renounced the task in despair. At other times, though I came empty, I was suddenly filled with thought showered upon me from above like snowflakes or seed, so that in the heat of divine possession I knew not the place, or the company, or myself, what I said or what I wrote."[7]

Before leaving Philo we should note,—in view of its importance in later speculation—that matter is to him that which limits action. This explains the fact that his ethics is reduced to the admonition to free oneself from matter. Everyone, he says, in this world of matter, this Egypt, should aim at becoming a Moses, living in Egypt only on compulsion, but with the will set upon wandering forth into the land of the free. "The goal of blessedness is unflinchingly and without wavering to stand in God alone."[8]

The future, then, was not with epicurean scepticism but with such thinkers as this Platonising Jew. It is he who will have philosophical progeny, not Lucian

[5] Quis rerum div. her. 42. Ritter and Preller, § 511. See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 20.

[6] But cf. Inge, *Plotinus*, Vol. I., p. 98.

[7] De migr. Ab. 7. (1,441). Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, pp. 22, 23.

[8] Frag. p. 669.—Ritter and Preller, § 516.

of Samosata, the exposer of frauds, the sturdy sceptic of all the nonsense that in that age masqueraded as religion. Nor were the select Stoic schools fitted to become the generating places of a popular creed, though they could attract the refined intelligences of the slave Epictetus (90—118 A.D.) or of the Emperor Marcus (120—180 A.D.). The leading philosophy was rather to arise out of the wide bosom of the Platonist tradition, where many sects existed, some more religious, some more philosophical, but all finding nourishment in the plentiful hints at religion, mythus and cult to be found in the works of the Master. The more popular and religious in their outlook were those whom we call by the generic name of "Neo-Pythagoreans" whose tenets were a mixture of all sorts of elements, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and even Epicurean. Of them the once famous Apollonius of Tyana was a leading light. We meet in him a direct spirit of rivalry to the rising Christian Church. Elements in the stories told about him are borrowed from the canonical Gospels, a miraculous draught of fishes, raisings of the dead and the like. He had also elements of his own, a silence for five years and a strict vegetarianism—nothing, he taught, is good enough to be offered to God Who is therefore most fittingly worshipped with that best of words which is not uttered by the lips. Of course the great difference between all these schools and the Church is that they were ready in all loyalty to conform to the state religion and to worship when need was the image and genius of Rome and the Emperor.

More to our purpose, however, are those teachers among the Platonists who made some attempt to present to their hearers and readers a scientific system of the universe. We find, for example, a curious development of a sort of "Trinitarian" metaphysic about that time. The idea seems to have arisen with a Syrian, Numenius of Apamea, in the middle of the

second century. A good deal of Numenius' inspiration comes, of course, from Plato himself and he seems also to have been acquainted with Philo and Jewish literature generally, calling Plato "a Moses speaking Attic." In the most prized of the Platonic dialogues the Timaeus, a sort of triad is suggested, God, the Ideas and the World-Spirit. The world is fashioned after the pattern of the Ideas which, if not by Plato himself at any rate by his successors, were conceived of as thoughts existing in the Divine Mind. Numenius taught that the Divine Nature was in the first place Mind, changeless and incorruptible, a "roi fainéant"—"basileys argós." This Mind cannot create, for the Creator must be double in nature, concerned with both the spiritual and the phenomenal. So we pass on to a second Being who created the world out of love of it and, in so far as it can possess such characteristics, endowed it with form and permanence. We thus get three Principles: Mind, the Creator, and the World.[9] With the world the Creator identifies himself in love. Yet there is still a dualism, a part of the world which is still refractory, with which the Creator can only "do his best." This seems a genuinely Platonic trait, a weakness from which Platonising philosophy can never wholly free itself. There are also other elements in Numenius, strange theories of numbers, half mythical, half mathematical. The following extract from a passage preserved in Eusebius may be of interest—it will be seen that he takes up a discussion that troubled the very earliest Greek thinkers, the question of the "stuff" out of which the world is made. "But what after all," asks Numenius, "is the existent? Shall we say that it is these four elements, earth and fire and the other two? Do they taken together form it? Or is it one of them alone? How indeed can it be so? For these things

[9] Our authorities say that in Numenius there are two world-souls, one good and one evil, but Inge doubts whether this has been correctly reported—*Plotinus*, Vol. I., p. 94.

come into being and often recur, we can see them coming one from the other and suffering change. They are without permanence either as single elements or as compounds. We conclude that no corporeal entity, such as these elements, can be the prime existent. But, perhaps while this is so, yet matter may be what we seek? But, yet again this surely cannot be, matter has no power of permanence. Matter is like a rushing and violent torrent whose depth and width are alike undefined and immeasurable. So then, I say that neither matter nor corporeal things can be truly existent. But, once more, is there anything else besides in universal nature? Yes, truly, it is nothing recondite but what we presuppose from the first in all our converse. For since corporeal shapes are dead and lifeless, borne hither and thither and never remaining the same, do we not recognise a Principle to rule and dispose them? By all means we do. If such were lacking, they would not abide for an instant. What, then, is this governing Principle? Now if it also is anything corporeal it will also stand in need of a Divine Deliverer to keep it from falling to pieces in dissolution. But if it must of necessity be free itself from the defects of corporeal natures in order to guard them from the decay inherent in them and to hold them together I cannot think that it can be anything else than simply the incorporeal. For it alone of all the universe is fixed and stablished and free of matter. It neither comes into being, nor grows, nor moves with any motion, and for this reason it is right and just that it should occupy the highest seat of all."[10]

The philosophers who carried on the tradition of Numenius and indeed of Plato to its natural completion demand our more special attention. They form the great school of the Neo-Platonists, that most remarkable phenomenon in the history of decaying

[10] Numenius, apud Eus. Prep. Evan. 15, 7. Ritter and Preller, § 526.

pagan thought. There was, as we have seen, reason for a revival of philosophy being connected with the name of Plato. We may add that that age was a great age of commentators, the monuments of the pure Attic tongue of ancient Hellas were loved and cherished by men who were conscious that their own Greek speech was less pure. It was natural, from this point of view also, that Plato in whom no element of literary grace is wanting, should be specially studied. So that men of education were not unprepared for a new and more scientific presentation of Platonic metaphysics. The founder of the new School is commonly reckoned to be Ammonius Saccas (200—242 A.D.). Little is known of him. He is said to have been a renegade Christian, leaving the Church in disgust at its opposition to the arts and sciences of the age. Oriental elements are also said to have prevailed in his teaching, in contrast to his greater successor, Plotinus, but it is difficult to be certain of the truth of these traditions as Ammonius left no writings behind and taught by the oral method exclusively. A fourth century writer, Nemesius, says that his object was to reconcile Plato and Aristotle.[11] But the real source of our knowledge of the Neo-Platonist teaching comes from the pupil, Plotinus; it is he who has given this philosophy its classical expression. He came to hear Ammonius—"this is the man I was looking for," was his verdict, but he seems to have extended and enriched what Ammonius taught him with a genius for metaphysic all his own. He deserves a far more thorough-going discussion than is possible within the limits of this chapter, but the reader who desires to know more about him can find what he seeks in Dr. Inge's delightful volumes.

Plotinus was born in Egypt in the year 205 and died at Rome in 270. His works consist of twenty-one earlier and thirty-three later treatises, edited

[11] See Inge, Vol. I., p. 95.

after his death by Porphyry, in groups of nines, whence they get their common designation "the Enneads." His philosophy forms one of the most complete of all ancient systems. It is built up from the leading thoughts of Plato and Aristotle, who, as is rightly seen, supplement each other. Anyone who should set out to prove that Neo-Platonism, as we have it in Plotinus, represents the real outcome of what Plato and Aristotle were trying to achieve would at any rate have a strong case. With all the obvious differences of milieu and of outlook, Plotinus saw deeply into the mind of his master. In Plotinus we have, of course, no longer the background of the Greek city-state, interest in the "political virtues" is all but non-existent. We have no longer the careful building up of general ethical or metaphysical ideas from the particulars of civic duty. We begin and end with the Absolute, "the One." It was a more fitting philosophy for an age of military despotism tempered by revolution.

We may perhaps envisage the whole Plotinian scheme as a commentary on the meaning and implications of the Platonic and Aristotelian categories of "matter" and "form," "power" and "act." The poles of Plotinus' thought are a pure Form without Matter, or a pure Activity without Potentiality, on the one hand, and on the other mere Matter, or mere Potentiality. Matter is that which of itself has no form, but is capable of receiving form, and since Form is that which is the cause of all intelligibility, it is clear that matter, as such, cannot be known, for if it were known, it would be *as something* and to be something implies the possession of Form. Then again, Form in its essence is One, matter is Many, so Plotinus tells us that the the highest Form, the Form of forms, is just the ONE. But, of course, the difficulties of all such philosophies begin when it is sought to explain why the One ever falls away into the Many, why the world should be there at all.

Plotinus gives us three higher principles, a kind of triad or trinity. Besides the One, we have Mind or Spirit and then the World-Soul. The One is, as we have said, Pure Form with no admixture of any sort of matter. It is utterly simple, entirely without distinctions. When we call it "One" we must be careful not to take this name in the sense of a number. All names for it are misleading but it stands in complete opposition to the many—the name "One" is the best we have. We might also call it "Beautiful," or "Good," but we must be careful not to think of it as *a* beautiful thing or *a* good thing. It is, in some unexplained way, the source and spring of all good and beauty, and of all unity. As each separate thing has a certain perfection, a certain "nature" (as Aristotle might say) proper to it, so the One is the source of all these perfections, these relative goodnesses and beauties. As regards all lower existences, again, we may ask the question, "why is such and such a thing the best of its kind?", "why is it, relatively, perfect?", and we may find an answer in contemplating the place which it occupies in some wider synthesis, in its "final cause," in fact. But of the One we can ask no "Why?" It is itself whole and complete and carries with it its own justification. Or again, Plotinus would deny that the One is conscious. That which is conscious is "many" and not "One," it would be a debasement of it to make it think. Neither has it will, nor indeed any attribute. As with Spinoza's Substance, "omnis determinatio negatio est."[12]

It must of course be borne in mind that in these metaphysical speculations Plotinus — and others too who have taught a similar philosophy—is struggling with the imperfections of human concepts and of human language. It would be a complete misreading of his purpose were we to understand him to imply,

[12] See En. 3, 9, 3, hè prosthéke afaíresin kaì élleipsin poieî. Inge, Vol. II., p. 115.

when he denies consciousness or will to the One, that it therefore *fell below* the level of rational or sentient creatures. As Proclus, whom we shall meet presently, says, the extremes at the top and at the bottom of the scale are simple, the intermediates are complex. The One is without creaturely attributes only because it soars so far above creatures of every order. What it has is, of course, far better than consciousness or will.

The second member of the triad is Mind or Spirit. The more we think over what is essentially implied in mind, or thinking, the more we see that Mind of itself, even when raised to its highest power, can not be, in modern phraseology, the Absolute. It seems to contain within itself an inescapable plurality, there is always that severance between the "what" and the "that" of thought, between the subject and the predicate of the logical judgement. Thus Plotinus tells us "thinking must needs be one and two, it must be simple and not simple at the same time."[13] But though Mind occupies the second rank, it is, nonetheless, eternal and its objects, what it thinks, are eternal likewise. These objects are none other than the Ideas, the heavenly patterns after which all created things are made. Mind contemplates them all eternally together. Compared with the One, Mind doubtless contains a duality, but it is a duality very unlike that of our gross thinking, Mind has no such process from object to object, from the known to the unknown as we are familiar with. There is nothing of which it is ignorant, so there can be no progress in its knowledge. The dualism, or "matter," here has hardly more than the name in common with the matter of the world of sense. It is, in fact, just a potentiality of receiving this or that form, but even so Mind is marked thereby as being on a lower level than the One which has no potentiality at all.

These, then, are the first two members of the triad.

[13] En. 5, 6, 1.—quoted Inge, Vol. II., p. 41,

As yet, however, there is no mediating principle between the pure world of Ideas and the material universe. Such a principle comes in with the third member, Soul. It is, in a way, a faded copy of Mind, a compound of thought and desire. Soul it is which forms the lower matter, so far as may be, after the divine Ideas of Mind which she sees as the object of her desire. She brings things to be by developing in each its "lógos," or definition, or sufficient reason. As regards the relation in which individual souls stand to the Universal or World-Soul, Plotinus can only say that our metaphors are misleading. We may speak of individual souls as "parts" of the World-Soul, but the World-Soul is not a sum of parts. We may speak of them as members of a Whole, yet each is complete in itself. This difficulty of describing in satisfactory language the relation of the individual to the Whole is common to many philosophical systems and by no means peculiar to Neo-Platonism. Plotinus also sees another difficulty when he speaks of a hierarchy of souls, some very much nearer Mind, the goal of the Soul's desire, than others, or when he tells us of the possibility of progress and regress for individual souls. He seems to build on less strictly metaphysical ground here, to be veering towards that mystical side of his teaching, former existences, transmigration and so on, a sort of Buddhist Karma doctrine.[14] Here, too, Plotinus finds a place for demons, there are godlike and demonic as well as human souls. The godlike he places in the stars, they live without passion and are completely blessed, the sublunary air is the home of the demons. The demons also are the highest of the creatures who make use of speech, the necessity for which is not felt in the higher regions of the scale of being. Human souls are the lowest of all, slaves of change and of passion, tied and bound about with matter. Plotinus does not seem to be quite clear on the

[14] En. 4, 3, 15.

doctrine of the freedom of the human will. Sometimes he speaks of the soul being "free" only when following the good,[15] in other places the soul may be free also to do evil.

Plotinus has some very curious arguments about time and space, tending to show that they are forms applicable to the lower world only and have no relevance in the higher. Here, as often, his remarks remind the reader of much later philosophies. In a discussion on the categories, it is worth while observing, he counts the category of "relation" as subjective, the rest as objective.

The lowest in the scale, the furthest removed from the One, is Matter. Like Numenius, Plotinus sees clearly that the original "world-stuff" cannot be one of the four elements; we have long since passed beyond the standpoint of Thales or Anaximenes. Water, he tells us, changes into air, earth into fire, so that neither of these can be the ultimate "hýle" out of which the world is made. Nor can the hypothesis of "atoms" be correct, for the infinite divisibility of matter would not square with a world of atoms. What we seek is nothing physical, Plotinus is quite clear on that point, but since matter is *ex hypothesi* that which is bereft of form, it cannot be an object of thought since each such object must have form. Matter is therefore a postulate, it has no qualities, though capable of receiving all, it is a mere potentiality which may become any of an infinite number of actualities. It may, for example, become fire, yet it is never warmed, or light, yet it is never luminous. This elusive problem of matter remains with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition all along. Plainly there is more than one sense of "matter" in Plotinus—the idea of it as a logical postulate will not explain that sense of degradation which attaches in his philosophy to the "material," making him, for instance, ashamed of his birthday, the anni-

[15] En. 3, 1, 9.

versary, that is to say, of the descent of his soul to this "lower" and baser region. That side of his thought also explains his attitude to natural science, the study of the "material" world. Dr. Harnack says, "Judged from the standpoint of pure science or the empirical investigation of nature, philosophy passed its meridian in Plato and Aristotle, declined in the post-Aristotelian systems and set in the darkness of Neo-Platonism." Aristotle emphasised the better side of Plato, but Plotinus goes back to the traditional Platonic disparagement of the "body" and of "matter." And he was at the commencement of a long line of philosophers who did so. Henceforth in the history of this tradition a strange "ascetic" tendency makes its appearance, a tendency quite foreign to Aristotle who frankly accepts the body and its pleasures, asking in their enjoyment only justice socially and temperance individually.

Accordingly Plotinus' ethics are what we might expect. He agrees with Aristotle that the life of contemplation is higher than the life of action. The new asceticism gives point to this preference, a point it did not have in Aristotle where it is *not* based on the teaching that the souls of men are fallen entities which belong by right to a higher world to which, as to their original home, they long to return. Thus virtue is really and essentially the discipline by means of which the soul can rid herself of matter and by slow degrees attain at last the vision of the One from which she came. But Plotinus realises that virtue is absolutely necessary in these lower stages of the souls' journey with which alone, here and now, we have to do. "Without true virtue," he tells us, "God is only a name on a man's lips."[16] But as the soul rises above the material world and retires more and more into the perfect freedom of her inner life, political virtues such as wisdom, justice, temperance and courage, become of less importance.

[16] En. 2, 9, 15.

Contemplation leads on to the goal of all striving the ecstatic vision. Here, of course, all words and all human categories fail us. Let Plotinus himself tell us all he can tell about it, in the closing words of the "Enneads." "It is," he says, "the life of gods and of godlike men, a deliverance from the other things here, a life untroubled by the pleasures here, a flight of the alone to the Alone."[17]

Plotinus is the last great name on the long roll of pagan philosophy, the last expression of the old Greek spirit that had not been converted to Christianity. A few words, however, must be said about his immediate successors. His follower in the School was Porphyry whom we have already met in this chapter more than once. Porphyry was known as a logician and as one of the keenest opponents of Christianity. All who have toiled at the school logic will remember the "Tree of Porphyry," showing the descent of the "infima species" from the "summum genus." He was the author, too, of the short treatise, called "Isagoge," or "Introduction," prefixed to the "Organon" of Aristotle. As we shall see in the next chapter this treatise has a considerable historical importance in the annals of human thought. His books against the Christians would doubtless be interesting reading but they are unfortunately lost, having been burned by order of the Emperor Theodosius II. From the fragments preserved in replies to them by the Greek Fathers, Dr. Harnack infers that Porphyry was the most serious critic that the Church of that age had to meet.

Another successor in the same school was Iamblichus. In his works we have an example how the later Neo-Platonism changes from a philosophical theory to a theological doctrine. To him has been ascribed, but it would seem without sufficient reason, the remarkable book entitled "The Egyptian Mysteries" which well illustrates the tendencies at work in the later

[17] En. 6, ad fin. (Tr. Thos Whittaker.)

paganism. One or two extracts may not be out of place.

i. A difficulty felt by religious pagans. "You put forward," says our author, "in your next question the difficulty that, although the gods refuse to hear a suppliant who lacks purity of heart, yet they themselves hesitate not to drive men now and again into unlawful lusts.... This difficulty, however, vanishes when we consider these actions of the gods as indeed a transgression of the limits of human law, but happening in accordance with another and higher order and law. Or such things, again, may come to pass as the harmonious concord of the universe demands, which yet involve irregularity from the standpoint of the parts."[18]

ii. On the reasonableness of prayer. "But, you urge, the offering of supplications and prayers is unwarrantable, considering the purity of the Divine Intelligence. Not by any means! Since indeed the gods do excel us in strength, purity and all else, this is the very reason why it is especially meet to besiege them with prayers. Our sense of our own nothingness in comparison with them makes us turn naturally to supplication. From the supplication we are gradually guided to the Being to Whom it is made, and from our constant communion with It we acquire its Likeness, and from our imperfections we become step by step possessed of the Perfection which is Divine."[19]

Before leaving Iamblichus, we may notice an interesting passage in his life in Eunapius' collection called "The Lives of the Sophists." It describes a report current about his levitation in prayer.

"A rumour has reached us," a disciple is represented as saying to the Master, "from your slaves to the effect that while in supplication to the gods,

[18] De myst. Aeg. 4, 11. The passage reminds us of Alexander Pope—"all partial evil universal good."

[19] De myst. Aeg. 1, 15.

you are raised more than ten cubits from the earth. Your body and raiment are changed to a beautiful golden colour. As you cease from prayer you become again such as you were at first, and descend to earth and resume your ordinary converse with us once more." Iamblichus, however, the historian tells us, refused to admit the truth of the story. In any case it illustrates the spirit of the school.[20]

The last Neo-Platonist leader of any importance was Proclus or Proculus, a Lycian, born at Constantinople in 410 or 411. He spent the greater part of his life as head of the Academy at Athens, which by this time had been captured for the Neo-Platonic philosophy. His biographer, Marinus, describes him as an example of the Aristotelian "eudaimonia" in that he enjoyed both external good fortune and lived the full period of human life. His death took place at Athens in 485. Proclus was an earnest devotee of the old gods—such as they had become to be at that age—when their public cult was forbidden, he still continued it in secret. He has been called the "Schoolman of Neo-Platonism." He left behind very considerable comments on Plato and others. He elaborates the system of Plotinus, distinguishing, for example, a triad of powers within the One, even speaking of an "altogether ineffable Principle" above the One.[21]

Proclus fully represents also the ascetic side of Plotinus' teaching. Similarly he insists on a kind of perception that transcends mere knowledge, or thought, as necessary for the apprehension of the Divine Nature. Aristotle had said that the Divine Life was "nóesis noéseos," "thought about thought," but Proclus remarks that it is really "above thought altogether," "epékeina tês noéseos." A more detailed examination of his system does not seem necessary

[20] Eunap. De vit. soph. p. 458. Ed. Boissonade, Paris, 1849.
[21] See Inge, Vol. II., p. 111.

as in no essential particular does he go beyond Plotinus.

It will be obvious that in all this period philosophy is moving into nearer touch with religion. Neo-Platonism becomes a religious rival of Christianity. It is interesting, therefore, to glance at S. Augustine's criticism of it as a religion. He finds it defective in three important points. First, it lacked a religious Founder; secondly, it could not tell how the state of inward peace and blessedness could be rendered permanent; and thirdly, it had no means of winning those who were not endowed with the speculative faculty—(the great majority of mankind!).[32] The Neo-Platonist teachers saw that religion was a necessity and their later leaders laid considerable and increasing stress upon revelation. It would seem that in so doing they were clearly guided by a right instinct. Without revelation a system of philosophy, however deeply thought out, can hardly be satisfactorily transformed into a religion—or if this could be accomplished, it would only be for that select band whose spiritual needs are adequately met by metaphysical abstractions. And with the particular abstractions inherited from Aristotle (who "sawed Plato into quantities") this was peculiarly difficult. It is hard indeed to extract religious emotion out of "matter" and "form," "infima species" and "summum genus," or to engender affection for that cold Deity who thinks about thought, who cannot by His very Nature give the world any love in return for its yearning towards Him. So, if a religion has to be made out of such material, it is clear that it must be supplemented by an element of revelation — and here S. Augustine's criticism comes in. A revelation, to be worth anything, must be a manifestation of the Divine Nature that all men can read, through persons and events in human history which have genuine credentials, and

[32] S. Augustine, Confess. 8. 18—21. Cf. also Inge, Vol. II., p. 206.

these paganism, in however refined a form, found lacking. To the present writer it seems that Dr. Inge clearly over-emphasises the religious, as distinct from the humanistic, or purely metaphysical, value of the traditional Greek speculation as it was worked up into the system of Plotinus. It is true that, as we shall see, the Christian Middle Ages took over that system and that it is the metaphysical background of some of the profoundest Christian thought and devotion, but whatever religious and devotional value the classical works of the thirteenth century may possess—and it is a great one—comes to them, not from Aristotle and Plotinus, but from the historically true Revelation of God in Christ.

Here we must leave Greek thought and turn in our next chapter to an age in which the metaphysic of Aristotle had been forgotten and only his logic had survived.

CHAPTER II.

SOME LOGICAL CONTROVERSIES OF THE EARLIER MIDDLE AGES.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to sketch in outline the development of logical theory in the earlier Middle Ages from the time of John the Scot to that of Peter Abélard, that is to say, from the latter part of the ninth to the middle of the twelfth century.

While we may be able to notice one or two of the minor currents of the many-sided logical speculation of this period what will chiefly claim our attention will be, of course, the great controversy about Universals. This controversy dominates all the other interests.

The question at issue may be envisaged in several different ways. In one aspect it is the emergence on logical ground of the old dispute between the One and the Many. Or it may be thought of as a dispute about the relationship of the Subject to the Predicate in the logical judgement, or about "causes"—the relative importance of the "material" as compared with the "formal" or "final" cause. There is always, and especially to some minds, a certain triviality about formal logic, but we must hasten to add that the logical game is generally played on the very margin of deep metaphysical problems. In these early mediæval disputes there was, no doubt, an element of logomachy, but at bottom they were concerned with matters which have troubled philosophical thought in all ages.

A controversy about universals is an attempt to find out the true nature of Reality. In a heap of stones, or a flock of sheep, where does reality reside? Is

it in the Many, or in the One? The natural man will, of course, answer that it is in the many, the several individual stones or sheep are alone real and everything else is "the work of the mind." The many are "objective," the one "subjective" and it therefore lies farther away from reality than do the many. No doubt this answer is quite satisfactory—until philosophers appear. Fichte, it may be remembered, said that to be a philosopher means to stand on your head, and it seems to be only a contortion of this nature that can maintain that the One has a better title to reality than the Many. Yet the claims of the One have not lacked advocates since the earliest dawn of philosophical thought in Europe. The Eleatics maintained them with vigour; from this school Plato received his doctrine of Ideas and became the greatest of all champions of the One. The manifold character of the Many is theirs because they represent the least stable aspect of the Universe. While we look, the particular dissolves and vanishes into nothingness. If we ask, as all rational beings must ask, for something permanent, we can find it nowhere save in the "Idea" which remains the same notwithstanding the infinite succession of its partial and temporary exemplifications.

Or again, as a definitely logical dispute, it seems a question between the Subject and the Predicate. The Subject is the particular, "this man," "this house," "Socrates"—that is to say the little bit of Reality, or of the Universe, that impinges upon my senses. Until I have given it a predicate, it is unintelligible, unexplained and foreign. It is merely *there*. But how again is the Predicate to be called "real"? At least a name, it would seem to be at most an idea. It appears as "the work of the mind" as opposed to the objectively existent. And this is the view, presumably, which such people as the modern "realists" would take. So long as the mind is looked upon as a sort of accidental satellite of

things, making no difference to an already existing world, it is difficult to ascribe reality to the predicate. The universal must, on that view, be less real than the particular. Yet in the logical judgement at all events it is the predicate which makes the subject anything at all to the knower.

The Middle Ages inherited a very complete logical discipline from the ancient world. Aristotle had worked out the implications of deduction in such detail that very little remained to be added to his work. At the beginning of our period the Organon was already in possession, as it has since remained. Porphyry had added a little and commentators and compilers like Boethius and Martianus Capella had gone over the ground. The more profound logical treatises, the two Analytics and the Topics, were not available until after the beginning of the twelfth century. But the treatises which were available, Porphyry's "Isagoge" and the "De Interpretatione" were quite sufficient to raise the controversy in acute minds.

Porphyry's "Isagoge" demands a little more attention than we gave it in the last chapter. It is, as we said, a sort of general introduction to the "Organon," or Logical Treatises of Aristotle and as such it is usually printed just before the treatise called "Categories" in editions of the philosopher. Its special subject is the "Predicables," the "five words," "quinque voces," as the Latins called them. They are, of course, genus, species, difference, property and accident. Porphyry discusses these in a somewhat elementary fashion—in his first chapter he disclaims all desire to treat the deeper questions which he sees standing in close relationship with his subject. "I will try," he says, "to give you a succinct account (of the predicables) . . . refraining from any remarks upon the deeper questions at issue, but giving a sufficient treatment of the simpler points. Concerning genera and species, I shall for the present put on one

side the problem whether they actually exist or lie merely in our conceptions, or whether, if they do exist, they are corporeal or incorporeal and whether they are divisible from, or contained in, the objects of sense perception and have their being in connexion therewith, as this subject is highly recondite and demands a further and more adequate enquiry." Here for the first time we find the problems of universals succinctly put. This passage contains, it will be observed, a kind of conceptualism and a kind of crude realism, and the remark that possibly genera and species may exist only in the particulars of sense is the ground-idea of nominalism. Boethius (480—526) comments on this passage and Isidore of Seville (died 636) likewise. Isidore gives a sentence containing all five predicables, "homo est animal rationale, mortale, visibile, boni malique capax." But the real question at issue was raised by none of these earlier commentators and seems to have become prominent only after that great thinker, John Scot Eriugena (800—872), had given his day and generation so much to ponder over in his revised Platonism.

It is strange that a Platonic realist of the type of Eriugena should have influenced the *nominalism* of later generations. But the importance which he ascribed to words as such follows from his general conception of the philosophical sciences. At this we must briefly glance. He tells us that the science of dialectics has four divisions—the first divides and separates one into many, it is "diairetiké, divisoria, unum in multo dividendo segregat," the second collects one from many by a common definition, it is "horistiké, definitiva, unum de multis definiendo colligit." The third division is demonstrative, by demonstration from the known it opens up the unknown, it is "apodeiktiké, demonstrativa, per manifesta occulta demonstrando aperit." Lastly we have the analytical division, which by a process of separa-

tion resolves composites into simple elements: "analytiké, resolutiva, composita in simplicia resolvit." Now while metaphysics or ontology is concerned with the first and fourth of these divisions, that is to say, with the dividing up of the One into the Many and with the ultimate return of the Many to the One, the two middle stages definition and proof, are the special sphere of logic. And since to Eriugena Reality in the true sense resides solely in the One, the objects of the science which deal with the many are naturally "words." Human language is specially concerned with definition and proof, here the categories are united to material things and words are the right medium in which to deal with objects of this kind. There must always be something verbal—and unreal—about the definition of particulars, the sphere, of course, of the Many. In another mood Eriugena sees a peculiar sacredness about human speech, connected in a mystical way with the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, and with the Mosaic story of Adam giving names to all creatures. So in later times this Platonic realist gave arms to the Nominalists and was called a "vocalis."[1]

After Eriugena the discussion of the "universals" problem becomes more and more self-conscious. Though all held to the canon of Boethius that the universal belongs to intellect, the particular to sense, ("universale intelligitur, singulare sentitur"), many difficulties made themselves felt. It was doubted whether the universals have a true spiritual substance, or whether they reside in individual corporeal existences. How do they appear in the world of sense? Are they "post rem," or "in re," or how?

Or, again, on the subject of human speech, Boethius had said that a thing is conceived in the understanding but characterised by speech. This was the relation of "res," "intellectus" and "vox." It suggested that words were of great importance, the

[1] See Prantl, Vol. II., p. 31. (Cf. Bibliography.)

treatises "Isagoge" and "Categories" dealt with names and words, "de primis rerum *nominibus* et de *vocibus* res significantibus." Hence from Eriugena's time onwards nominalist utterances become more and more common. For instance, in a commentary on Boethius, ascribed to Rhabanus Maurus (776—856), nominalism finds clear expression. Formal proof is given that the predicables are descriptions not of things but of words—the "genus" is that which is *predicated*—a word. The Categories are certainly words, Boethius calls them "nomina," "dicit enim illa nomina novem esse."[2] Another strongly nominalist teacher of the period was Eric of Auxerre who died in 881. This writer, like Eriugena, had some knowledge of Greek. He gives a sort of logical ladder from the "infima species" to the "summum genus" which, he characteristically says "uno *nomine* constat." On the other hand, one of Eric's pupils, Remigius of Auxerre, maintains in his commentary on Martianus Capella, the realist position. Remigius taught at Rheims and at Paris. Everything, according to his view, that has existence has it by participation in the highest substance—"cujus participatione consistit omne quod est."[3] Or, if we say that Cicero is an orator, that is an accident of Cicero, but oratory exists *per se*, before being united to Cicero. Remigius and his pupil, Otto of Clugny, were the spiritual parents of the great realist, William of Champeaux. The tenth century seems to have been poor in logic even the great scientist that marked its close, Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester II., is in ignorance of any translation of the "Topics" or the "Analytics." This was an age of curious compendia of learning, bizarre versifications of the rules of deductive logic were much in vogue. Its glosses and dictionaries would make a curious study. By way of specimen we may quote the following definition of the Greek

[2] See Prantl, Vol. II., p. 39, note 151.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 45, note 176.

verb "eimí," given in the "Glossarium Salamonis," a compilation of the period. "Eimi," the learned author tells us, is a "verbum substantivum, id est, 'sum,' cujus participium praesentis temporis neutri generis 'ens,' plurale ejus 'oysa,' id est, 'entia,' cui addita iota format hoc nomen quod est 'usia,' id est, 'essentia.'" Early in the eleventh century an unknown author translated the "Isagoge" into hexameter verse, of which the following is an example:—

> Post haec bis quinas pandamus categorias
> in quis vir doctus non ex ipsis quasi rebus,
> sed signativis de rerum vocibus orans
> sumit ab omonymis synonymisque
> principium.[4]

Here we have a clear nominalist tendency. We find the same in Notker Labeo, who had the merit of publishing a logic in German for the first time. Later in the century the study of logic as such fell into the background, being obscured by the outbreak of the Berengarian controversy about the Sacrament of the Altar. But logic had its place in this matter also. Berengar contended that all parts of a proposition must subsist if the judgement is to be logically true. As he put it, "non constare poterit affirmatio omnis, parte subruta." That is to say, in any proposition, e.g., "Socrates is just," it must be granted that both "Socrates" and "justice" do subsist as such, no part, either the subject or the predicate, can be suppressed. So when the Church says "the Bread of the Altar is the Body of Christ," if this is to be held true, we must believe that both

[4] See Prantl, Vol. II., p. 60, note 242; cf. also the lines ascribed to Pope John XXI. (Petrus Hispanus) in the 13th cent. (1210—1277).

> "Distribuas medium, nec quartus terminus adsit,
> utraque nec praemissa negans nec particularis.
> Sectetur partem conclusio inferiorem,
> et non distribuat nisi cum praemissa, negetve."

—the rules of the syllogism.

the substance of the Bread and the substance of the Body of Christ subsist.

We must now turn to the consideration of the great nominalist leader, Roscellinus, whose activity falls within the last two decades of the eleventh century. We are in the unfortunate position of knowing his teaching only through the reports of his bitter enemies. There is still extant a letter of his addressed to Abélard, but it contains nothing to throw any light upon his logical doctrines. He was, apparently, born in Armorica (Brittany) and studied at Soissons and Rheims. Afterwards he was canon of Compiègne where he had Abélard for a pupil. He seems to have spent some time in England in the earlier part of his career. His teaching, which won some renown for him, was not altogether novel but the completeness of its expression in his hands marks him off from the more tentative pioneers who had preceded him. To him individual substances alone exist, we apply universal terms, the predicables and the categories, to words, "voces." What Anselm, his enemy, says of him and his school is well known—"illi utique nostri temporis dialectici, immo dialecticae haereticae, qui nonnisi *flatum vocis* putant esse universales substantias"—"they consider universal substances to be nothing more than the breath of the voice."[5] Anselm calls them "the heretics of dialectic" and indeed this logical doctrine did lead Roscellinus to take heterodox views about the Trinity—the Three Divine Persons, he said, are Three Substances Whose Unity consists in the fact that They are entirely alike, Arius was only wrong in his subordinationism. Nor was it only universals that Roscellinus refused to allow. Abélard speaks of "the mad opinion of Master Roscellinus who would not grant that anything consisted of parts—parts, like species, were words or names only." Perhaps we might say that Roscellinus was a subjectivist with

[5] Anselm, d.f. Trin. c. 2. Prantl, Vol. II., p. 78, note 319.

an atomic theory of the Universe. Atoms only exist, everything else is the "work of the mind." He was probably not quite clear as to the distinction to be drawn between "word" and "thought" and attributed to "word" what other thinkers of substantially the same outlook more correctly ascribe to "thought." He seems also to have fallen into the pitfall of concluding that if genera and species are "verbal" ("mental"), they must be fictions also. As a specimen of his reasoning—again as reported by Abélard—we may take the following refutation of the possible existence of "parts."—"if that thing which is a wall, is the wall of that other thing which is a house, since the house consists of nothing else but wall and roof and foundations, the wall will be part of itself and of the two others—but how can it be a part of itself? Or, again, every part is by nature prior to its whole, so how can a wall be said to be prior to itself and to the roof and foundations? In no way can it be prior to itself."[6]

Such extreme nominalism or vocalism aroused the defenders of the traditional doctrine. We get a curious glimpse of the party strife at Lille and Tournay. At Lille, Raimbert was a professor of the new method while Otto, afterwards bishop of Cambrai, at that time at S. Martin's Abbey, Tournay, championed the old-fashioned realism. The story goes that one of the canons of Tournay, perplexed with these discordant "voces," and, presumably, not claiming for himself enough intellectual acumen to decide between them, visited a deaf and dumb soothsayer in the neighbourhood who decided without any doubt at all in favour of Otto's traditionalism. At any rate, the chronicle of Tournay so reports.[7] It is worth noticing that the nominalists are here called "moderns."

[6] Abélard, de Div. et Defin. ed. Cousin, p. 471. Prantl, 2, p. 80, note 321.

[7] See Prantl, Vol. II., p. 82, note 326.

Another opponent of Roscellinus was William, abbot of Hirschau, who died in 1091. He is interesting as having based his defence of realism on Arabic authorities. He is also the first mediæval author to give us a formal "a priori" proof of the existence of God, a proceeding which, as Prantl remarks, could only be undertaken on realist presuppositions. But no real successors to Roscellinus and Raimbert came on the scene. The great influence of Anselm on the other side seems to have prevented the spread of the extreme views.

Early in the next century, however, the struggle began again in a new phase, closely connected with the tragic life and death of the gifted French thinker, Peter Abélard. The twelfth century witnessed a great progress in logical studies, not only because it was adorned with many eminent logicians but also because it saw the restoration to European thought of some of the parts of the Organon which had up to that time been unknown in the West, the two Analytics, the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi. These treatises were probably fully known, for instance, to John of Salisbury who died as bishop of Chartres in 1180. Thus Prantl speaks of the year 1100 as the beginning of a new era in the history of logic.

The Realists, the school of the old logic, did not lack champions as extreme on their side as any Roscellinus of the innovators. One such thoroughgoing Platonist was Bernard of Chartres. He said that the men of his generation were a race of dwarfs, standing on the shoulders of those of old time. Reality, as Plato said, resides in the universal. The following is an example of his curious style "albedo significat virginem incorruptam, 'albet' eandam introeuntem thalamum.... 'album' vero eandam sed corruptam"—this is the downward course of pure being from its intellectual home until it becomes

contaminated with the things of sense.[8] But Bernard does not explain the present relation in which the universal stands to the particular. This was left to the greatest of all realist champions, William of Champeaux. This thinker was born at Champeaux, near Melun, about 1070, in later life he was archdeacon and scholasticus at Notre Dame in Paris and he died in 1121, bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne. It is much to be regretted that we do not possess any of William's own treatises and, as in the case of Roscellinus, we are dependent upon enemies, chiefly the testimony of his former pupil Peter Abélard, for practically all that we know about his teaching. His thought is also very elusive and it is particularly difficult to grasp what he really intended to say. This is how Abélard describes his teaching: "at length I reached Paris where logical study had been already most wont to flourish and went to my instructor, William of Champeaux, at that time the chief professor of the art both in fact and in repute. I stayed with him for a short while and was at first favourably received, but afterwards became most irksome to him for I attempted to refute certain of his opinions and very often came forward to argue against him and on some occasions I was found his superior in debate... Among our other bouts of argument I compelled him to alter, nay, to destroy entirely his original opinions about the universals. For his opinion about the connexion of the universal and the particular was that he represented the same thing to be wholly and at the same time 'essentialiter' in every one of its particulars, which would so differ not at all in essence but only in the number of accidents. This opinion he so far modified that he subsequently used the word 'individualiter' instead of 'essentialiter.' After making this correction, or I should rather say, after being compelled

[8] Quoted in John of Salisbury, Metal. 3, 2, p. 120. Prantl, Vol. II., p. 126, note 93.

to abandon this teaching, his lectures fell into such neglect that he hardly found it possible to speak about logic at all—as though the sum of this discipline consisted in the discussion of the problem of the universals. Hence did my own lectures obtain such power and influence that those who had formerly been most eager partizans of my teacher and most energetically opposed to my own theories, flocked to my benches."[9]

The second of the opinions attributed to William in the passage above quoted is extremely difficult to make intelligible and as Abélard tells us that it was only a desperate expedient to parry his own criticism, probably it did not represent any very considerable contribution to the subject. Some MSS. read "indifferenter" instead of "individualiter" but "indifferenter" comes from another school and does not seem to have been germane to William's thought. The substitution seems, however, to show that contemporaries found it hard to make anything of what is almost certainly the correct reading. We may, therefore, confine our comments on William to his first, or "essentialiter" doctrine. According to this view, the universal exists in its absolute completeness in all the individuals falling under it, which possess therefore only one essence and are differentiated from one another accidentally only. This would lead us to say that Peter is essentially the same as John, for in both "homo" is completely and essentially contained. The obvious conclusion is that in such a case Peter *is* John, and John Peter. It might be argued that Peter is not a man at all, for the whole of human nature is already placed in John. On this theory, the individual is reduced to a mere unsubstantial appearance and not only, it would seem, the individual but all intermediate genera and species as well, and we are left with the "summum genus" alone. The One has swallowed up the Many. We

[9] Abel, Epis. I., c. 1, p. 4. Prantl, Vol. II., p. 129, note 104.

shall find something analogous also in the later Aristotelianism.

The school of William was well aware of the pitfalls that beset the realist teaching—the echoes of many different attempts to modify the asperities of the original doctrine have come down to us, and of efforts to meet and parry special difficulties. One such difficulty was connected with the question of the species-making "difference," e.g., "rationality" which makes the species "man" out of the genus "animal." Is it to be considered a mere instrument, so to say, or does it pass over with the genus into the essence of the species? Another thorny question was that of contradiction—for example, virtue and its contrary vice seem to meet together in, say, a man who is at the same time chaste and avaricious. Some said that no concurrence of contradictories was possible in the lower species, but might occur in genera, virtue and vice could meet in one person, but not a special pair of contradictories such as generosity and avarice. And there were many other controverted points.

Mediating positions between the two extremes were taken up by writers such as Walter of Mortagne (died 1174). This teacher abandoned the crudities of William, to whom the universal was a *thing*. To Walter it is a state—an altogether different conception—to him not "universale" but "status universalis" is the watchword. "In quantum" or "in eo quod" are his favourite expressions—reminding the reader of the "quatenus" of Spinoza. Another intermediate position was taken up by those who spoke of the universal as an "indifferens" or a "consimile." The element which is both in Peter and in John, in an "indifferent" or "similar" element. Certain individuals agree together in certain elements of their nature, in so far, say, as they are bodies, or in so far as they are animals. The element which is thus indifferently, or similarly, present is the genus, for

by definition the genus is concerned only with the common attributes of the particulars. This doctrine again, however, is properly speaking an abandonment of realism for it goes upon the *nominalist* assumption that what actually exists is not the universals but individual substances. Universals, on this theory, are subjective, they arise from a thing being regarded from different points of view—"aliter et aliter attentum." They are made by the intellect of the observer —"universale colligitur," as they say.

Realism thus appears to have suffered successive modifications which leave it little removed from nominalism, the new logic seems to have won the contest. An advance in this controversy was made by Adelard of Bath, whose book "De Eodem et Diverso" appeared in 1115. Adelard went back to the old principle that the universal is the object of intellectual perception, the particular of sense perception—"universale intelligitur, singulare sentitur." The universal as it appears to us is one thing, as it truly exists in the Mind of God quite another. Aristotle, he says, sought the universals where alone *we* can find them, namely in the particulars, Plato looked for them where they have their true being. The differences between these two philosophers are therefore verbal, at bottom they are agreed. This teaching at any rate seems to see the truth that the universal exists in a different mode of being from that of the particular, whereas William and his school had tended to regard them as both on one identical plane. Adelard decidedly marks an advance. Another clear-sighted writer is the unknown author of the work called, "De Generibus et Speciebus," ascribed in the MSS. to Abélard. This important treatise criticises in turn all the different schools of the day. As against nominalism, the author appositely contends that genus cannot be a "vox" since words do not form a real whole at all, nor can one word be the matter of another word or represent the relation-

ship in which genus stands to species. Against the exaggerations of William he objects that if the whole essence is individualised in a single subject, then all the various accidents of that essence should be individualised with it; Socrates would be in Rome just as much as in Athens, since to be in Rome and to be in Athens are both accidents of "man" and the whole of "man" on William's theory is individualised in Socrates. As against the "indifferens" theory, he remarks "Socrates does not communicate the nature which is his to Plato, for neither the animal nor the man in Socrates is found anywhere else except in Socrates."[10] He lays stress upon the necessity of a creative power, which must be present to make a *thing*. He follows Porphyry and Boethius in holding that the genus is "matter," the difference "form," or, in the individual the species is matter, and the different individuals are made out of it by their individual differences. Though these individuals are essentially many, yet the species as a single conception ("collectio") can rightly be spoken of as "an universal," or "a nature." We cannot say that the whole species is individualised in each individual, but only a part of it, that is to say, an essence which is not identical with the totality which makes the whole species but which has only a relation of similarity with it—"similis compositio, similis creatio."[11] The subtle author arrives at last at a conception of the "First Principle." This, too, has "matter" and "form." The essences that belong to a genus are not distinguished as regards their matter and have the generic difference for their form. Likewise, the matter of the Summum Genus is "pure essence"—"mera essentia"—and its form is just the receptibility of contraries—"susceptibilitas contrariorum." Prantl remarks that by thus "telescoping" essences he arrives at a position resembling that of William of

[10] De gen. et Spec. p. 519. Prantl, Vol. II., p. 144, note 155.
[11] Prantl, Vol. II., p. 145.

Champeaux himself.[12] The treatise goes on to consider the import of propositions, or the nature of predication. According to the author, the judgement never asserts that the subject actually *is* the predicate, but only that it is one among the number of the things which are constituted from a certain matter or underlie a certain form. It follows that the name by which we call a species never really applies to the species itself but only to the individuals which comprise it. To quote his own words: "cum dicitur 'Socrates est homo' hic est sensus 'Socrates est unus de materialiter constitutis ab homine'—simul, cum dicitur 'Socrates est rationalis' non iste est sensus 'res subjecta est res praedicata,' sed 'Socrates est unus de subjectis huic formae quae est rationalitas.'"[13]

It is apparent that we do not get a really satisfactory theory of predication on these lines. The author's thought seems to tend to a doctrine of "the One besides the Many," the view combated by Aristotle as that of the Platonists.

Other questions besides those arising out of the universals controversy were also discussed. Much attention was given to the Categories, whether, for example, "situation," "time" and "place" were not subdivisions of "quality," whether, with regard to "quantity," individual numbers were, or were not, to be considered so many species of the genus "number." In some of the discussions on "vox significativa" logic and acoustics got entangled. The air alone made itself heard, to it alone therefore "signification" must be ascribed. Then there was the difference between "significare" and "nominare," the one relating properly to the universal, the other to the particular here and now present. Another important discussion centred round the significance of the copula in the judgement—does it imply exist-

[12] Prantl, Vol. II., p. 147.
[13] Prantl, Vol. II., p. 148, note 169.

ence? Does "Homerus est poeta" mean that Homer exists? And so on.

We must now turn to consider the greatest logician of the period, the man who, in effect, brings this epoch to an end, Peter Abélard. It is, as we have seen, to his writings that we must look for all that we know either of the nominalism of Roscellinus or the realism of William. His works give us the richest storehouse of logical thought that we possess since the time of Eriugena. The tragic story of his life and death has been often told and it is no part of our task to go over it again. Nor need we pronounce upon his virtues and vices except, perhaps, to remark that his rather pronounced vanity ought to make us cautious in accepting too literally all that he says about the discomfiture which he caused to other teachers. The main facts of his life are well known. Pierre de Pallet, surnamed Abélard, was born in 1079. He is sometimes styled "Palatinus," a Latinised form of Pallet. He calls himself "philosophus peripateticus." Such appellations are almost as frequent in the contemporary literature as "Abaelardus." We have already seen that he studied under both the leaders, Roscellinus and William. His troubled life was chiefly divided between Paris and Brittany. He died near Châlons in 1142 at the Monastery of S. Marcel. His tomb in Père La Chaise cemetery in Paris is well known.

His writings include not only logical treatises but theological works of importance which greatly influenced the scholasticism of the succeeding century. He is also the author of some hymns, of which one at least "O quanta qualia sunt illa sabbata," is well known to English-speaking people by reason of Dr. Neale's translation, "Oh, what the joy and the glory must be," which has found a place in most hymn-books.

Abélard's logical works are the "Dialectica" and the "Glossulae ad Porphyrium"—these are to be found, so far as they are now available, in Cousin and

Rémusat respectively. They have also been used by Prantl in the work to which this chapter is so deeply indebted. Prantl gives an admirable account of what we can now know of Abélard's system. It is usually held that Abélard is more or less of a revolutionary freelance but Prantl thinks that in logic at least he shows little originality, and keeps close to his authorities, Aristotle (as then known) and Boethius. But he seems at least to have had a clearer idea of what was at issue than did the others who preceded him. It was the same in his theology—for this his work "Sic et Non" may be referred to. He at least sees "lions in the path."

Of logic Abélard had a high opinion, not shared by many moderns, though perhaps by more in this generation than in the immediate past. He quotes Augustine—logic alone can make men wise, "potest facere scientes." By logic heretics are refuted and the true doctrine made secure, the heretics are pseudo-philosophers. The dignity of logic is made manifest from its etymological connexion with Lógos, the Word of God. In another mood he qualifies without more ado those dialecticians who do not agree with him as "atheists." He claims Aristotle as his, "nil adversus Aristotelem" is his watchword. The contemporary historian, Otto of Freising, took these statements so literally that he speaks of Abélard as a nominalist of the school of Roscellinus. But there are also passages in which Abélard extols Plato as the greatest of the philosophers, or again tries to reconcile him with Aristotle. Some modern writers, from the fact that he attacked both the leading schools of his day, have called him a "conceptualist," and his precise classification has always been somewhat of a puzzle to ancient and moderns alike.

As we have seen we must go for the "Dialectica" to Cousin's work, "Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard" (Paris, 1836)—the treatise is not, unfortunately, printed in the Migne edition of Abélard. The plan of the

work is somewhat as follows, the first division deals with "parts of speech," "liber partium," under three headings, "antepraedicamenta," discussing the "Isagoge"; "praedicamenta" discussing the "Categories,"; and the "postpraedicamenta," on nouns and verbs as the necessary parts of judgements—logic and grammar are somewhat mixed together, the authority of Priscian is quoted as well as that of Aristotle. The second chief part of the work deals with the categorical judgement—"liber categoricorum" —and the third and fourth parts with the hypothetical judgement—"liber topicorum" and "liber hypotheticorum." An independent monograph wherein the interests of logic are mingled with those of rhetoric—"liber divisionum"—completes the work. The first part of the treatise is now defective.

Abélard argues against extreme realism that it would result in the confusing of all substances in the one "summum genus," no one substance could be distinguished from another or from the Divine Nature. Against those who taught that genus and species were an "indifferent" or "similar" element in the particular he quotes the usual definition of genus "that which is predicated of more than one"—"quod praedicatur de pluribus." One and the same thing cannot be both particular and genus. He bases his own view of the nature of predication and, by inference therefrom, of the problem of the universals generally upon the statement of Aristotle in the seventh chapter of the "De Interpretatione" that the universal is "tò kathólou," is that whose ground-characteristic is that it is predicated of many subjects, "quod natum est," as Boethius translates the Greek of Aristotle, "de pluribus praedicari." This is the motto of the whole logic of Abélard. Neither things as such, nor words as such are the universal, it has, on the contrary, its being only in predication, in the logical judgement, the "sermo." This enables us to avoid the mistake of supposing that one thing can

be predicated of another thing—"res de re non praedicatur." Whatever is predicated, since it must exist "ex hypothesi" in many things at the same time, is, for the very reason that it can be predicated, not a thing but just a predicate. Nor, again, can a "word" be an universal, but its meaning may. Genera and species may be words, but words are not genera and species. Genera and species in so far as we think them are certainly grounded upon something real, that is to say, something exists which gives occasion for such universals to arise. From this point of view, the traditional differences between Plato and Aristotle are not important, Plato saw one side of the case, and Aristotle another. Other attempts to reconcile these two philosophers we have noticed already, for Abélard the definition of the universal, "quod natum est," etc., supplies the ground for reconciliation. When we say "natum est," this shows that universals belong to the true order of nature and are no mere figments. As Plato might contend, they are there by objective right. When we say "praedicari," that expression points the quarter where we must look for them, not in things, or in words, but just in predication, in the judgement, the "sermo."

Abélard agrees with the author of "De Generibus" that the genus is the "matter" of the "species" and that the "form" of the species is the "substantial difference"—"differentia substantialis." It is the function of the Difference to "create" the species out of the genus. Of course this does not indicate a time sequence, the priority is logical only. Then there is also the puzzle about the co-existence of contradictory attributes in the same subject, which we noticed on an earlier page. To this Abélard would say that not all forms bring into being a separate substance out of their matter but only such forms as are species-making differences. Thus, "rationality," a species-making difference, brings into being "man"

out of "animal." On the other hand there are "accidental" forms whose presence make no substantial difference between the individual things which possess them and those which do not. Their presence implies a separable accident only. No pair of contradictories can come together in a single subject so far as substantial forms are concerned, but this may happen in the case of accidental forms. When it does, it means that the contradictories are contained as potentialities in the matter of the genus. This is Abélard's way of recognising what later philosophers have called "real kinds" in nature.

Particulars, again, differ, according to Abélard, essentially from one another. He would express it thus: Plato has a different essence from Socrates, though "rationality," the "substantial difference" makes them to be of one substance, namely, that of man. "Being," "ens," is a word of many meanings, whereas the ultimate substance, the "genus generalissimum" is the final matter whereon the species-making difference begins its work. This conception has been called the "Spinozism of Abélard," but it is not confined to him.

Looking again at Abélard's doctrine of predication we find that he gives as the real ground of predication the fact that logical judgement ("sermo") stands in a true and original relation to things. The significations of genera and species are products of the creations of the substantial difference. Genera and species come to a *concrete* existence only in the individual thing. *As such,* they possess no such concreteness, in accord with the old rule "singulare sentitur, universale intelligitur." Now the intellect is not concerned with that which falls within the province of the senses but only with that which falls outside that province. Consequently the non-sensible universal is the proper object of predication, and being predicated brings into prominence just that sphere of the non-sensible which is proper to the

intellect; in other words, as Abélard expresses it, "the judgement is generated by the intellect and generates intellect in turn"—"sermo generatur ab intellectu, et generat intellectum."[14]

The judgement is thus, so to say, a sort of middle point between thought and things. The content of the judgement is not things but thought, yet it deals with things—"de rebus." It represents for thought the real connexions of things in the process of creation. Abélard distinguishes that which the judgement contains from that with which it deals. Our speech is not reality, but only deals with reality. In reality things have an infinite number of qualities, attributes, etc., but judgements are simple, only one quality is predicated at a time, and so on.

It will be clear from the foregoing that Abélard marks a great advance in logical doctrine. The earlier thinkers, Roscellinus on the one side and William on the other, had been content to sacrifice one or the other of the terms to be explained. To Roscellinus there was no such thing as an universal at all, it was a pure fiction, a word and nothing more. To William the particular could hardly be said to exist. Abélard in contradistinction to these writers sees that both terms are necessary and that it is impossible to do without either of them. He has, as we noted on a previous page, been called a "conceptualist" and this, to a certain degree, is a true designation. But it becomes at once misleading if we understand by "conceptualism" a theory that the universal has the whole ground of its being in the "concepts" of individuals. To Abélard, however highly he values—and rightly values—the logical judgement, universals have their ground in the last resort not in any "subjective" concept but in the nature of the Universe.

[14] Prantl, Vol. II., p. 182.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION IN ISLAM. AVERROES.

Our last chapter dealt with the development of logical thought in the West. We must now turn to enquire into the beginnings of metaphysical thought, as revived according to the Aristotelian tradition, among the Mohammedan thinkers of Spain and Morocco.

The Neo-Platonists whom we considered in our first chapter found curious heirs among the Arab race. The philosophy of the ancient pagan world was, as we know, driven from the confines of the Empire in the reign of Justinian in the sixth century, when the last of the philosophers left Constantinople for Persia. This event was of the nature of a symbol, for Greek ideas were at that time being made accessible to the orient by means of Syriac and, later, Arabic translations of Greek writers, in many cases the work of Nestorian scholars who centred round Edessa, a city where East and West used to meet, or by Monophysites, working in the same intellectual field, centring, of course, on Alexandria. The translations, thus acquired, of Aristotle and others were most highly prized by the earliest Arab thinkers who forthwith set themselves the task of expounding in their own language those precious texts which seemed to enshrine all that was extant of intellectual culture. It is surely one of the strangest phenomena of the history of the human spirit when we find Aristotle, the typical Greek, becoming the idol of Arabs who neither at all understood his language nor had the faintest glimpse of the milieu in which he lived and worked. Yet such is the innate rationality of the human mind that philosophy and, as it will be

attempted to show in this chapter, by no means a contemptible philosophy, continued to flourish obscurely and fitfully, amid the darkness of Islam. Despised and spurned by the dominant party, this philosophy might have been entirely lost to the world but for the lucky circumstance that certain Jewish thinkers preserved many of its most characteristic monuments in Hebrew versions and so transmitted them to Christian Europe, to S. Thomas Aquinas and the later schoolmen.

Islam was from the first the Religion of the Book. The story of Omar at Alexandria, if not true in fact, is at least characteristic—books which are contrary to the Quran are pernicious, books which agree with it superfluous. But still, even in that stifling atmosphere, thought could not be entirely suppressed. First in the field were some theories of Free Will, running counter to Islamic fatalism. Then in the eighth century a sect of Motazilites, "dissidents," arose, proving or attempting to prove philosophical or religious truths by dialectical argument. As attempts at independent philosophising became more frequent, a certain science, called "Kalam" (word), extended to cover philosophical as well as purely religious deductions, was called into being. Its professors were known as "Motakallimin"—translated, via the Hebrew, in our Latin texts as "loquentes." Even at that early age one of the principal philosophical "heresies" was the question of the Eternity of the World—so the Motakallimin set out to prove the Creation, or the Novelty, of the World. They even developed a kind of atomism—"God creates unceasingly"—to such a degree that the principle of Causality seemed in danger of being destroyed at their hands. Other thinkers, again, doubted the possibility of any such "philosophy of religion," of any such attempt "to justify the ways of God to man." They were all heresies. Such an one was the famous Ashari, who lived from about 880 to

940 A.D. He himself began as a member of a Motazilite sect, but came to see later in life that their position fell between two stools. With their attempted rationalisation of religion they satisfied neither philosophers nor champions of the Quran. So Ashari withdrew from them. A characteristic story is told of him: conversing with his teacher, a certain Gubbai, Ashari asked a question about three brothers of whom one was a believer, pious and God-fearing, the second an unbeliever, frivolous and ungodly, and the third only a child. And they all died as they were. "In what condition," asked Ashari, "are they now?" The teacher made answer that the pious brother was upon the Ladder of Blessedness, the ungodly was suffering the pains of hell, and that the child was of the company of those who are at peace. "But," asked Ashari, "if the child wishes to attain to the state of the blessed, will it be permitted to him to do so?" "No," replied the teacher, "it will be said to him: 'thy brother hath attained to that place of bliss only by means of the many good works which he has done, but thou hast no such good works to show!'" "But if," asked Ashari, "the child were to say: 'permit me, the fault is not mine. Thou didst not allow me to live and hast, therefore, deprived me of the opportunity of doing good!'" "The Creator will say," answered Gubbai, "'I knew that if thou hadst continued in life, thou wouldst have been disobedient and wouldst have rendered thyself worthy of the penalty of pain. I only had thine own good in view in doing what I have done.'" "But," answered Ashari, throwing his noose, "what if the unbelieving brother were to answer: 'Lord of the World, even as Thou didst know the condition and fate of this child, so also didst Thou know my condition and my fate. Wherefore didst Thou take thought for him and not for me?'" Then Gubbai, the teacher, replied, "Art thou mad, Ashari?" But Ashari answered, "No,

I am not mad, but the ass of the sheik has stuck fast in the narrow path." This story is not without its profundity and well illustrates the weakness inherent in what is called "common-sense theology" when brought face to face with the inscrutable providence of God.

The philosophers proper, those who looked for guidance to the old Greek tradition, had to meet both these oppositions, on the one hand from the orthodox Moslems who refused any rationalisation on the text of the Quran, and on the other these adepts of the Kalam, dwellers in a half-way house, industrious and pious, but entirely incapable of satisfying a rigorous thinker.

Such was Averroes' world, but before coming to him it will be well just to glance at his predecessors in philosophy, strictly so called, among his fellow Arabs. Among many names we will just pick out one or two. The first name on our list will be that of Abu-Yusuf Yakub bin-Ishak AlKindi, who died in 870 A.D., just before Ashari was born. AlKindi was noted chiefly as a logician. He was charged by the Khalif AlMamun (for some of the Khalifs were favourable to philosophy) to translate Aristotle into Arabic. Like all the Arab philosophers he was noted also as a medical man. It has been said that the proper way to come to philosophy is through Natural Science—if so, these Arabians all seem to have taken the right road. AlKindi held all the usual peripatetic doctrines, including the Eternity of the World, of Time and of Motion. The next considerable philosopher worthy of notice belongs to the tenth century, Abu Nasr Mohammed bin-Mohammed bin-Tarkhan AlFarabi, called so from Farab, the place of his birth. He also was a man of great attainments in natural science. He seems to have been quite an attractive figure. His Aristotelianism was more than usually tinged with Neoplatonism. A remarkable book of his still survives,

called "De Intellectu," or "On the Principles of all that is." He enumerates six Principles of things, from the Divine Principle, or First Cause, down to abstract Matter. Below the First Cause and the "Intelligences"—which mediæval Aristotelians took over from the Neo-platonists—comes the Active Intellect, a very important conception to be discussed in more detail a little later. AlFarabi tells us that when the human soul reaches the Active Intellect it attains to prophetic revelation—always a subject of interest to a Moslem—and his doctrine really implies what is known as the "Unity of the Intellect" or that there is One Thinker in all thoughts. As a consequence there can be no personal immortality—but all this we shall meet again in a more fully developed form in Averroes himself.

The eleventh century brings us to the great philosopher Avicenna, for so the Latins called Abu 'Ali alHosein bin 'Abdallah Ibn Sina, who was born at Bagdad in 980 A.D. and lived until 1037 A.D. He was in general a more orthodox thinker than the other philosophers. His teaching formed a most remarkable system and is deserving of a far more detailed treatment than can here be attempted. As an interpreter of Aristotle he was less satisfactory, and some of his teaching seems to suggest, for example, that First Matter had a temporal as well as a logical priority over Form. He allows himself to speak of the Active Intellect, the Agent of reason in individual souls, as a Giver of Forms. For this he is justly upbraided by Averroes. It is, however, doubtful whether Avicenna was really a peripatetic at heart, his true convictions seem to have been contained in a work now lost, called "Oriental Philosophy." This seems to have been neo-platonic or even pantheist. There was much in him, too, of the religious teacher; for instance, he describes thus the blessedness of the soul that is united to the Rational Order of the Universe and the Good: "but being

in this world and in these bodies, submerged in evil desires, we are incapable of feeling this high blessedness. And this is the reason why we do not seek it and do not feel ourselves drawn towards it unless we first deliver ourselves from the ties of desires and passions in order to understand something of this true pleasure. For then we are able to make in our minds some feeble idea of it, if only our doubts be resolved and we are enlightened on the doctrines relative to the soul... Man is only able to free himself from this world and its ties when with strong affection he attaches himself to that Other World and his desire draws him thither and forbids him to look behind. This true felicity can only be secured by bringing to perfection the practical part of the soul, to wit, its moral life." Here, again, Avicenna, like his predecessors, seeks an explanation of prophetic insight.

But these religious tendencies did not protect the doctrine of Avicenna from the scornful opposition of the orthodox traditionalists—it was principally against him that the famous AlGazali directed his attack, and a very remarkable attack it was. AlGazali was a twelfth century professor in a Moslem college at Bagdad and he made it the principal business of his life to show the baselessness and inconsistency of the contemporary peripateticism, how its doctrines fall to pieces by their own inherent defects. He chose no less than twenty points of attack, and chiefly the doctrine of the Eternity of the World. Much of what he says reminds the English reader of the position taken up by David Hume, with a very different object in view, in the eighteenth century. For instance, according to AlGazali there is no such thing as "Cause" or "Effect," one event happens *after* another, that is all we can say. But we must not linger over AlGazali. His greatest work is the "Destruction of the Philosophers" which Averroes answered in his "Destruction of the Destruction."

Gazali, at the end of his life, found peace among the mystic sect of the Sufii's. The twelfth century also saw another Arab philosopher, called Ibn Badja, in Latin books Avempace. He wrote a book called "The Régime of the Solitary," about an ideal commonwealth. He was also one of AlGazali's opponents. Still another of the same school is Ibn Tofail, famous for his philosophical romance, "The Living, the Son of the Vigilant," wherein he describes how a lonely man on an uninhabited island progressed from a knowledge of the multiplicity of things to a knowledge of their Unity.

None of these philosophers, however, attained the prominence of the great twelfth century Commentator on Aristotle, Averroes, and to him the remainder of this chapter must be devoted.

Abu-Walid Mohammed Ibn Ahmed IBN ROSHD was born at Cordova in the year 1126 and after a very busy life in Spain and Northern Africa died on Thursday, the 10th December, 1198. His grandfather and his father before him had been Kadis or Judges at Cordova and he himself at one time held this office. His wide range of studies included theology, jurisprudence, poetry, medicine and mathematics. On many of these sciences he composed treatises—his medical treatises are specially famed, such as the "Colliget," or "Generalities" which enjoyed among Jews and Christians a great vogue for a long time. He experienced both the favour and the disfavour of the Court. An unsympathetic Ruler banished him to Morocco where he died.

For the purposes of this chapter, however, his most important works are his commentaries on Aristotle. Of these there are three kinds: 1. The Great Commentaries, probably written last in order of time. In these the text is quoted in full and comments follow. 2. The Middle Commentaries where each paragraph begins with a quotation from Aristotle, introduced by the word "kal," "he said," followed by develop-

ment and explanation where it is sometimes not easy to distinguish between Aristotle and the comment, and 3. The "Paraphrases," the most original work of Averroes in this sphere, where the results of Aristotle's doctrine are given. There are a few independent works such as the "Destruction of the Destruction," already mentioned. These works are preserved in a large number of MSS. The originals in Arabic of a few treatises are found, however, only in the Escurial Library and in the Laurentian Library in Florence. Some MSS. in Hebrew characters are found in Oxford and Paris, and Hebrew translations abound. From 1480 to 1580 Latin translations of the whole or part of his work came out nearly every year—specimens can be seen in the British Museum. But there have been no editions in modern times.

Averroes wanted to be Commentator only,—and as Commentator *par excellence* he is known. To reveal the hidden treasures of Aristotle, that was his aim in life, that was his supreme goal. He regarded Aristotle with the greatest possible veneration, almost with religious worship. Nature tried to show the ideal of humanity to the world and produced Aristotle. "I hold," he tells us, "that this man Aristotle was a rule in Nature, and an exemplar that Nature produced to give a demonstration of humanity in its completed perfection." Consequently whenever, as often, Averroes attains an independent or novel point of view, it is, so to say, by accident and against his will. Such veneration for the Greek Master naturally produced the result that Averroes stood a good deal apart from the religion of his time and country. He acquired the reputation of a great heretic. But it would be a gross mistake to think of him as a blasphemer or impious. On the contrary there is evidence that he fulfilled the religious duties of a good Moslem. And in his eyes religion was a necessary preliminary to philosophy. A man,

he tells us, must accept the principles of the Law (for so Jewish, Moslem and Christian writers in the Middle Ages often spoke of religion) and must conform thereto. Obedience to the Law is so important that contumacious heretics who contemn it may justly be put to death. Of religions some are more perfect than others. It is, moreover, a principal task of philosophy to prove the Existence of God. Such was his attitude to Religion.

To understand anything of his actual doctrines it is necessary to look a little closely at the Aristotelianism which he inherited. It may perhaps be described, in very general terms, as a sort of rather crude spiritual realism. In the last resort it was a dualism, with its two poles of formless Matter and matterless Form. To Plato the world of sense is a sheer hindrance to the Good, it is something that ought not to be there—if we would behold the Essential Beauty, we must close the bodily eye. Aristotle makes a distinct advance upon this theory, but he never overcomes the dualism inherent in it, and this dualism Averroes faithfully reproduces.

Thus, everybody is compounded of two elements, one "matter" and the other "form." The "substantial form" constitutes the "quiddity" or that by virtue of which the thing is what it is. Again, the "form" is an Universal, made an object of thought by the abstracting power of the understanding, abstracting from the particulars perceived by the senses,—an universal is a predicate which can be predicated of many objects.[1]

How a natural object comes into being can be seen to some extent from the analogy of the coming into being of a work of art. This analogy shows us that mere matter and form are not in themselves sufficient. There must be also an Efficient Cause, an Origination of Motion. The work of art first exists as an intelligent thought in the mind of the

[1] See the last chapter *passim.*

artist and is brought into actuality by an efficient Cause. From this we may conclude that only that which has been *thought* and is therefore the actualisation or expression of *thinking* can in its turn become the object of thought. The artist's work is intelligible to others because he himself first had the "idea" in his mind. We are prepared, therefore, for the Neo-Platonic development of Aristotle which Averroes accepts as the Master's own, namely of the Separate Intelligences. This, said Averroes, is the truth underlying Plato's theory of Ideas, only it is not the Ideas which are separate and eternal, but the Intelligences. The highest of the Intelligences, the First Efficient Cause of All, is, of course, God.

Turning to the phenomena of "becoming" and "generation," we find that these imply as a necessary preliminary a matter which is capable of receiving a particular form, but is at present deprived of it. It is, however, deprived only in a relative sense, for generation means the production of something out of a real something, not out of not-being. And corruption is the reverse process. It will be seen on a moment's reflection that what is subject to generation and corruption is neither matter nor form but that which is compound of both, that is to say, particular bodies.

Or, to look at the world dynamically, that is, from the point of view of efficient causation, it appears as a number of agents working upon a number of potentialities. At once the concepts of "Power" and "Act" arise. There is that which is already something, something "actually" or "in act"—the iron that is now (actually) hot, the stone that is now cold. But also there are those things which may become something which at the present moment they are not actually—of them it may be said that they have the "potentiality" or "power" of this or that quality. The iron now actually hot, is potentially

cold, for it may become cold. It is hot "in act," but cold "in power." Now what is generation but, as Averroes says, "the conversion of a thing from that which it is in potentiality into that which it is in actuality," in other words, a process from power to act?

We start with the First Matter, which is "in power" to all things but actually none, we end with a first Form and Prime Agent which is entirely realised and has no potentiality. It follows that such a First Form has no motion[2] for motion is only the educing of power to act, and in the Prime Agent there is no power to educe. So it is Pure Act. This is God, the unmoved Mover of the Universe. We cannot, of course, ascribe Will to Him in the ordinary acceptation of the term, for Will implies motion, in the sense of as yet unrealised potentialities. He cannot be thought of as better, or more highly developed to-day than He was yesterday. He is complete and perfect now.

Turn now to the Primal Matter at the other end of the scale. It too neither comes into being nor passes away. Generation and corruption do not touch either matter or form as such, but only the objects compound of them. Or, again, time,—time is "a measure of motion according to before and after." Consequently there can be no time before time, no beginning of time, time and motion are alike eternal —but, as we saw, motion means "educing act from power," and this is, therefore, an eternal process, matter has been moved to form from all eternity. Consequently from whatever angle we look at it, the World is eternal. According to Averroes, the concept of "a Day of Creation" is self-contradictory. It would involve, furthermore, a low conception of God. Before He created was God lacking in something, or more perfect on the Day of Creation than He

[2] Cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, c. 26, p. 500, "Nothing genuinely perfect can move."

was on the day before? Did something hinder the Eternal Cause that it should delay to produce Its proper Effect? On such lines Averroes might easily retort upon those who spoke of him as a "blasphemer"—who, he might ask, is really the "blasphemer," I who say that the Perfect Cause has always had Its Perfect Effect, or those who imagine that It first existed imperfect and then became more perfect? That would mean, among other things, a God above God, for power can never be educed to act save by something already in act.

Or, take again the old problem of the One and the Many. What makes the Many many? It is the element of matter; for the Universal, or the Form is One but is exemplified in many individuals. These individuals agree in their form but differ in their matter. The moment that we apply this plain and simple Aristotelian principle to psychology, we find ourselves at once in the midst of the second of Averroes' famous "heresies," the "Unity of the Intellect." Aristotle, he argues, has given a definition of soul that none would care to dispute. Soul is the Form of the body. Form, being Form, is One, body, as matter, is essentially many. Consequently, to speak of many individual souls ("separate forms") is a logical and metaphysical absurdity from the start.

Let us now turn to the Separate Agents and, in the light of what we have learned of Averroes' metaphysics, examine briefly his cosmology. First, let us notice that two species of "change" in matter can be distinguished, "substantial change" and "accidental change." Here on earth, matter may be the subject of substantial change, one thing may pass away and give place to another thing, earth may change into fruit and so on. Or the substance may remain as it is and may change only in its accidents, that which is black may become white, the hot may become cold and so on. But when we observe the heavens (with only twelfth century means

of observation at our disposal) we find there only accidental change, and that only of one kind, to wit, change of place or local motion. The heavenly bodies neither come into being nor pass out of being, all that they do is to change their place. Consequently, Averroes concludes that the matter of which they are composed is a different kind of matter from that of sublunary things. To Averroes the "Forms" of this heavenly matter are animated organic Beings and he accepts the neo-platonic notion of a hierarchy of Intelligences from the sublunary sphere right up to God. Now of what knowledge are these Intelligences possessed? We shall be ready to agree that, on Averroes' principles, the Highest Intelligence, God, must have perfect knowledge. Now, "perfect know-knowledge" means knowledge of that which is most knowable, knowledge in which there are no unresolved surds, so to say. Such a knowledge contains no element that cannot be known, in other words there is no element of matter in the knowledge of God. For matter just limits knowledge, just introduces an unknowable element into what otherwise is intelligible. God can have no matter in His Knowledge. But the particular is just made particular by this very element of matter, as we saw above. It is, as we saw, matter that divides up the One into the Many. So it follows clearly and inevitably that God cannot know the particular or the individual. Of course this is *because* He is omniscient; it is no failure or lacuna in the knowledge of God that necessitates the exclusion of the particular, on the contrary, it is the very perfection of the Divine Knowledge that demands this exclusion. God, the Most Perfect Knower, has the Most Perfect Knowledge—therefore we must say that God knows Himself. We see this in another way also. That which is known is the perfection of the knower. Therefore, God cannot know anything lower than Himself for He cannot seek His perfection in anything lower

than Himself. His knowledge of Himself is alone absolutely satisfactory.[3] Precisely the same holds of all the other Intelligences, though of course, they have not God's perfection. Each of them is perfected by its knowledge of the one higher in the scale—in their case knowledge of self is not sufficient, so they strive to perfect that knowledge of self (which they have) by acquiring knowledge of the Intelligences above them and of God. When we say "they strive," we introduce an element of "Will." We saw reason to believe earlier that will, in the proper sense, was not found in God—He has nothing to strive for, He is Complete and Perfect already—but Will comes in here among the lower Intelligences, Will and an increasing plurality which is naturally greatest in the lowest grade intelligence of all, in the intelligence of man.

For man has an intelligence. He has a certain activity of soul wherein no bodily organ is called into play. That definition of the soul, "the form of the body," mentioned above, though absolutely true and right so far as it goes, yet does not exhaust the whole implication of the existence of a human soul. Besides its life as a singular natural object, the human soul has also an universal life of Intellect. Intellect, as Aristotle tells us, can exist either in Power or in Act. Aristotle finds in the soul a "passive intellect" which has the potentiality of "becoming all things" that is to say, of mirroring all objects faithfully, without essential distortion. But what is passive or potential must be raised to activity and it is one of the root principles of Aristotle that that which is passive or potential cannot be raised to activity except by something already in Act—you can't make a piece of cold iron hot unless you have a furnace which already is hot. Similarly, potential intellect cannot become active except by an Intellect which is already active.

[3] See additional note at end of chapter.

We have already seen that there is and can be only One Soul, One Intellect in humanity, rendered many by the element of matter brought in by the fact of the human body. Now this One Intellect Averroes identifies with that at which Aristotle had hinted when he spoke of a Mind coming in "from out of doors,"[4] and which the Neo-platonists and the Greek commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias had elaborated. This is the lowest of the Intelligences, and belongs to the sublunary sphere. But it is the One Thinker in all men's thoughts. It is a matter of considerable dispute among scholars how far here Averroes has correctly interpreted his Master. It is far too thorny a subject for discussion here, but it can be quite reasonably maintained that Averroes is only making explicit or, perhaps, developing in a more or less neo-platonic form the essential thought of Aristotle. Professor Burnet, for example, in his Lecture on Aristotle at the British Academy in 1924, stated that in his opinion Aristotle's treatise on the Soul was largely written for the sake of the brief passages about Nous or Mind that come at its close. So that there is nothing extraordinary about the later commentators, long before Averroes, fixing upon this particular point and developing it.

But, of course, intellect calls for analysis, there are many stages or steps—and here we enter upon one of the most difficult topics discussed by Averroes. He distinguishes in the human soul at least three stages or steps of intelligence. First there is the "passive intellect," a faculty of distinguishing or comparing individual ideas, a faculty also in its degree possessed by the beasts. This faculty is individual and differs greatly from man to man. It forms, however, a "disposition"—an expression which Averroes took over from the great Greek Commentator of the third century, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Upon this passive intellect and its sensible ideas the "Material Intellect"

[4] De Gen. An. II. 3.

can work. This concept of "Material Intellect" is the most difficult of all Averroes' concepts. It is very hard to make it intelligible at all. It is separate from matter in the sense that it is not a faculty of the individual soul and is not in the individual soul as its subject. By working upon and using as its material the sensible ideas of the passive intellect which are potentially intelligible, the Material Intellect can become intellect in Act. But this is by means of the Active Intellect which takes the potential intelligibilities of the Material Intellect and makes them actually intelligible. Again, the difference between the Material Intellect and the Active Intellect is a difference of relation only. One and the same Intellect is now material, now active. But it is material only as participated in by a human soul. Material Intellect *in its relation to souls* differs from one soul to another, but in its own essence it is quite otherwise. *There* it is One, Unbegotten, Incorruptible and Eternal in every way. Considered in itself, the Active Intellect has all forms of things within itself. The intelligible forms, however, which are contained potentially in sensible imagination must be brought by the Active Intellect to actuality. In so far as the objective, universal Active Intellect is, in the individual, the bearer, or the subject, of this actually intelligible knowledge, it is called Material Intellect.

As man progresses in knowledge, he makes the universal Intellect more and more his own, he acquires what Averroes calls "intellectus adeptus." Now some curious consequences are drawn from this. "Intellectus adeptus," for instance, can never be thought of as a mere unrealised potentiality, it must be always realised somewhere—the meaning is, that though Socrates and Plato die, yet philosophy is not only eternal but there must be someone actually philosophising somewhere. "Material Intellect," says Averroes, "is not sometimes intelligent and sometimes

not, except in regard to the forms of the imagination existing in one or other individuals, not with regard to the human race. So that it does not happen to it that it at one time has the intelligence of 'horse' and at another time not, save in regard to Socrates and Plato, but in regard to the human race it always has this intelligence, unless the race should fail altogether—which is impossible."

But the mind of Averroes on this most obscure part of his Philosophy will be best seen from the following passage translated from Munk's French version of an Arabic original:—

"We say, then, that it is necessary that the faculty which receives the impression of intelligible things must be entirely impassible, that is to say, it must not be subject to the alterations to which the other passive faculties are subject by reason of their connexion with the object in which they are found. The only passivity of this faculty must be its perception and the fact that it is, in power, similar to what it perceives, but other than it. Let us illustrate by a comparison: this faculty is to intelligible things as the senses are to sensible things with, however, this difference, that the sensible faculty is in a way mingled together with the subject in which it is found whereas the other faculty must be entirely free from any admixture or mingling with any material form whatsoever. Indeed this faculty which is called the "hylic," or "material," intellect, thinks all things (that is to say, perceives the forms of all things); it must needs therefore be free from any admixture of any form, in other words, it must be in no way commingled with the subject in which it is found, in the way in which the other bodily faculties are commingled. For if it were thus mingled with any form one of two results would happen: either the form of the subject with which the faculty were mingled would become an obstacle to the forms

which the faculty should perceive, or it would alter the nature of the forms perceived. And if this were the case the forms of things would no longer exist in the intellect such as they are but would be changed into other forms which would no longer be the forms of things. But it is the nature of the intellect to perceive forms in such wise that they remain what they really are and therefore it must follow that this faculty is one which is commingled with no other form... If this be the case, its nature can be that only of a simple disposition—I mean that the intellect in power is a simple disposition and not some thing in which the disposition would be found. As a matter of fact, this disposition is found in a subject, but as it keeps itself entirely apart from it, the subject is not itself intellect in power. The opposite is the truth in the case of what are called hylic or material faculties. In their case the subject is a substance, either composed of matter and form or simple, e.g., primary matter. Such is the meaning of "passive intellect" in the interpretation which Alexander of Aphrodisias gives of Aristotle... Upon consideration of the doubtful elements contained in the opinions of Themistius and others it becomes clear that, as Alexander avers, the material intellect is in one sense a disposition exempt from any hylic or material form, but in another respect it is a Separate Substance endowed with that disposition. I mean that this disposition found in man is something which is attached to the Separate Substance because that Substance itself is joined to man, but at the same time the disposition is neither anything inherent in the nature of that Separate Substance, as other commentators thought, nor yet a mere disposition as Alexander said. What proves that it is not a mere disposition is the fact that the material intellect is able to conceive this disposition entirely empty of forms while it perceives the forms. Were it a mere disposition, it would have, in that case, to perceive

the non-existent, perceiving itself empty of forms. Consequently that which perceives the disposition and also the forms which supervene upon it, must necessarily be something beyond a disposition. It is accordingly clear that the material intellect is something composed of the disposition which exists in us and of an intellect which is joined to this disposition and which, in so far as it is so joined, is an intellect predisposed (in power) and certainly not an intellect in act. But again it *is* an intellect in act when and in so far as it is no longer joined to the disposition. This intellect is none other than the ACTIVE INTELLECT . . . In so far as it is joined to the disposition, it must be necessarily intellect in power only, without the faculty of perceiving itself but with the faculty of perceiving that which is not itself, that is to say, material things. But in so far as it is not joined to the disposition, it must of necessity be Intellect in Act, perceiving itself and not perceiving material things . . . In our souls there are two kinds of activity, first that of making the intelligible forms and secondly that of receiving them. The intellect in so far as it makes these forms is called active, passive in so far as it receives them, but it is only one single identical thing. From what has been said, the two opinions about the material intellect will be clear, that of Alexander and that of the other commentators. But the true opinion is that of Aristotle which unites them both. On our hypothesis we avoid the mistake of making a Separate Substance into a kind of disposition (as the commentators do) for we affirm that the disposition is found there not from the nature of the Substance itself but by reason of that Substance being joined to another substance wherein that disposition has an essential place, and that substance is human nature. And again in positing that there is something which this disposition touches in an accidental manner we avoid making intellect in power,

or material intellect, a simple disposition—the error of Alexander."[5]

But the work of the Active Intellect is by no means confined to making the human soul rational. When rationality is brought into being, the Active Intellect draws the now rational soul to itself, what it has made, it now consumes. This is the End of Man, to live the Universal Life of Active Intellect. "Man's final blessedness," Averroes tells us, "is when he attains to the intellection of Abstract Intelligences" and the path thereto lies across philosophical speculation—up to the last the great Arabian is faithful to the doctrine of his Greek Master.

It will be apparent from the foregoing sketch that this philosophy of Averroes, is no mean or unworthy achievement of the human spirit. It shows us reason triumphing over obstacles that might well have seemed insurmountable. Of course, from the past, as Renan in his own treatise on Averroes reminds us, we must seek only the past—no-one nowadays would seriously propose that we should model our thoughts about the Universe upon what was said in the twelfth century at Cordova. That may be admitted and yet it may be claimed that the time the historian of human thought spends on these Arabs is by no means wasted. The student of metaphysics can afford to neglect no period of human thought, least of all any period of the evolution of the Greek tradition upon the foundation of which all the rational thought of the present day is built. And again the history of human thought is of surpassing interest for its own sake, if "the proper study of mankind is man" the student may well linger over that which is most characteristic of man, his rational mind. And Averroes has succeeded in expressing some eternal truths even in his bizarre and old-world categories. What is that Active Intellect, for example, but a twelfth century counter-

[5] S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, pp. 445—448.

part of the "Spiritual Principle in Nature," which Professor T. H. Green expounds in the classic first part of his "Prolegomena" in refutation of the sensationalist school of Hume and Mill? The conclusion of Averroes that God does not know the individual is the same as that which troubled many souls in the Victorian era, which Tennyson expressed in the language of emotion in "In Memoriam":—

"So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life."

Or once more and lastly, the study of a far-off writer like Averroes shows us one most important consideration, namely, that the metaphysics of any age or place can never be separated from the ground in which it is built, the state of the natural sciences and other human activities of the time. We cannot accept a writer's metaphysics when we have wholly outgrown his physics. We may, of course, develop along analogous lines certain tendencies in his philosophy, but after a few generations, if not before, we shall have to write out a new version of his metaphysics, to do it practically all over again. Thus we have several "Platonisms," neo-platonism, Cambridge Platonism and so on. But these are not Plato, since Plato was conditioned by his time and place. So also even if a modern Averroism (and Averroism is another most interesting chapter in the human story) were desirable, it would be something perforce widely different from the work of Ibn Roshd.

Note to p. 58. "THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD."

God's Essence, because He is Pure Intelligence, is to be found entirely in His Knowledge. Averroes says "the Substance of immaterial things is knowledge and intelligence." As God is completely One there can be no distinction in Him between Knower and What-is-Known. This is true in its degree in all knowing. Averroes says again "our intellect is such that when it knows knowable things it turns to knowing itself, since its essence is the essence of things knowable. Much more so is this the case with the Separate Intelligences.

For our intellect possesses its properties because it is not fixed in matter, although it has a certain dependence upon matter and the same will be true in greater degree of the Separate Intelligences which have no dependence upon matter. Therefore in their cases knower and known will have a greater unity than we possess, for although in us the knower is one with the known yet it suffers certain change from the fact that it is attached to matter."

God's knowledge is neither of the particular nor of the general so far as things are concerned. Averroes says "God knows all beings but in a more noble manner than as they are in themselves . . . true philosophers do not attribute to God, blessed be He! knowledge either in particulars or in universals. For knowledge which is conditioned in such a manner is without doubt a passive knowledge which has a cause, but the First Knower is Pure Act."

Experience, moreover, teaches us the same truth, namely, that God does not know the individual. Otherwise there would be a conflict between His Goodness and His Almightiness. Averroes says "the opinion that these Intelligences have a care for all individuals is quite an erroneous opinion. If they cared, they must know, but in what way could they acquire constantly particular new bits of knowledge, especially when such would be infinite in number? Whoever maintains this cannot by any device avoid attributing wickedness to God, for if God rules by His care every individual life, how comes it that the individual suffers so many evils when all the while God is caring for him?—By 'so many kinds of evil' I mean such things as it is possible for a man *not* to suffer. For if necessary evils happen to any individual no one need say that those are not from God. But the major part of those who hold this opinion about God's providence, or care, imagine that they can attribute possibility to Him—'all things are *possible* with God,' they say—and thus according to them there is no escape from attributing wickedness and injustice to Him. But it is clear as day that it is impossible to speak about 'all things being possible.'"

Probably Averroes has in mind in these and similar passages the doctrine of Aristotle concerning chance, an irrational element which is nevertheless found in this sublunary world.

CHAPTER IV.

ARISTOTLE AMONG THE JEWS, MOSES MAIMONIDES.

The first three Chapters have dealt with various phases of the tradition of Greek philosophy in the later pagan and early mediæval periods, the tradition of metaphysics among the Neo-Platonists and the Arabs and the logical tradition in the West of Europe. This chapter will call attention to an interesting sidelight upon the development of Aristotelianism in orthodox Judaism. The Jews were by no means indifferent to philosophical studies but their nation produced only one great man who gave his life to these studies, Moses, the son of Maimon, and he must claim a somewhat detailed sketch in the present chapter.

Moses Ben Maimon, commonly known under his Latinised name of Maimonides, was a younger contemporary of Averroes, born in the very same town of Cordova nine years after him on 30th March, 1135. He afterwards travelled eastwards, became court physician to Saladin and died in Cairo on 13th December, 1204, having survived Averroes by six years. Maimonides was a voluminous author, he wrote many books on various sciences and on Jewish theology but only one of his works is germane to the present purpose and that is the celebrated "Guide for the Perplexed," written contemporaneously with the Commentaries of Averroes. The language of the original was Arabic but it was soon translated into Hebrew, then into Latin, and in modern times various other versions have been given to the world, notably an excellent French translation by Dr. Saloman Munk and a most useful English version by Dr. Friedländer.

The book is called a "Guide for the Perplexed" because it is intended to help those whose philosophi-

cal studies have brought them face to face with religious difficulties. The last Chapter has supplied evidence, if any were needed, of the real perplexity which the study of Aristotle caused to the orthodox follower of Islam. In that religion we found that the student had a choice between Mohammed and Aristotle but could not have both. The great intellect of S. Thomas Aquinas certainly made matters much easier for Christians and we can thus see without difficulty that Moses had a real and urgent task awaiting him when he began the "Guide." It is addressed to his pupil, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Aknin, and through him to all earnest enquirers in doubt between the religion of the Old Testament and the new philosophy of the peripatetic school.

The book falls into three parts, first an explanation of the right sense of Scripture, which is not that which appears on the surface, secondly a philosophical disquisition on the Creation of the world and concerning the unsatisfactoriness of the "reconciliations" and general outlook of the Motakallimin, and thirdly a miscellaneous treatise on Divine Providence and some other matters, linked on to a commentary on the Vision of the Prophet Ezekiel.

Although Maimonides does not express such an extreme of reverence for Aristotle as does Averroes, he is none the less a sincere and convinced peripatetic. He is quite sure that whatever can be demonstrated by science must be maintained. His mind is entirely "rationalist," he is the implacable foe of all superstition and mythology. There enters into his mental composition also a rather curious ascetic tinge, quite foreign to Aristotle and to all Greek thought but not without its analogues in the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages. But he is all the time a true Jew and not a little rabbinical subtlety is in evidence nearly everywhere.

He begins by attacking at once the formidable problem of the Old Testament anthropomorphisms.

Of course nothing could seem at first sight further removed from the "Actus Purus," the "Thought about Thought," of Aristotle than those descriptions about the Divine Being in human language, as One Who "walked in the garden in the cool of the day," Who "repented," was pleased and angry in turn. Unless such expressions can be satisfactorily disposed of, it is useless to talk about philosophy at all. There would be, indeed, an impasse not only between the religion of the Old Testament and Aristotelianism, but between that religion and all rational speculation if passages which ascribe a body to God are to be taken literally. Accordingly the first part of the "Guide" is taken up with an exposition of "homonyms" in the Old Testament, that is to say, of words that are applied to God in one sense but to creatures in an entirely different sense. For example, "Elohim" is applied to God, but also means "angels, judges and rulers," "to see" means to see with the bodily eye, but also to perceive intellectually. So that when we read of God as "passing by" that must not be understood to mean that God moves since only creatures with bodies move in the primary sense. The Torah is addressed to ordinary men, not to philosophers, and ordinary unphilosophical men cannot easily conceive existence unless in connexion with a body, therefore attributes implying perfection are applied to God under corporeal figures. Such adjectives are intended only to predicate perfection and in no other sense. To apply locomotion, or adjectives implying it, literally would not be to apply perfection since, of course, literal locomotion is the result of some want and God has no lack of anything. So also "rest" is an Homonym, that only which moves can literally "rest." It therefore implies as ascribed to God perfection only and thus the literal sense is ruled out.

The more philosophical part of the "Guide" begins with the last section of the first part where

Maimonides weighs in the balance and finds wanting the proposed reconciliations of the Kalam of the Islam of his day. He will have none of the sceptical theories and pitiable makeshifts of the Motakallimin. As his criticism of these writers goes on much the same lines as that of Averroes it need not detain us. No doubt the arguments of these thinkers had a certain attractiveness in their day but to a modern reader their refutation seems a rather wearisome "slaying of the slain."

The Second Part opens with philosophical proofs of the existence, incorporeality and unity of God. Maimonides' proofs of God's existence are not entirely the same as those of S. Thomas Aquinas,[1] but run on the same general lines. The first proof is the same in both. It turns on the beginning of Motion. All motion can be traced back, says Maimonides, to the Motion of the "Fifth Element," or the Sphere—but the Sphere is set in motion by a Prime Mover. The second proof goes to show that there must be a Being that imparts motion without being itself set in motion. The third argument turns upon the nature of the transitory and the permanent. It is similar to the corresponding proof in S. Thomas. There must be a permanent Being which is Absolute, and not contingent or transitory. The fourth proof also corresponds with S. Thomas, an Agent "in act" is necessary for anything to pass from power to act. These proofs at the same time demonstrate God's incorporeality and His unity. In this section of the "Guide" there is also much cosmology, theories of the spheres, composed not of our four elements but of a purer fifth element unknown in this sublunary world. The Spheres, moreover, fall into four groups, moon, sun, planets and fixed stars—this seems, says Friedländer, peculiar to Maimonides, he likens these four groups to the four causes, the four elements of the sublunary world and the four classes of beings,

[1] See the next chapter.

viz., mineral, vegetable, animal and rational; the "Angels" of the Bible are identical with the Intelligences of the Spheres.

Maimonides has thus far followed Aristotle entirely, his account up to this point is altogether peripatetic But now among the Aristotelian principles he finds one which he is forced to reject, since if he admitted it, he would be bound to throw over the religion of his fathers. He enumerates twenty-five propositions of Aristotle which he accepts altogether, then he adds a twenty-sixth "Time and Motion are eternal, constant and in actual existence." As this proposition implies the eternity of the universe, he rejects it with the remark that, in his opinion, Aristotle himself did not consider his own proofs of it satisfactory. So we see that even here Maimonides does not desert reason and logic. He refuses to say, with the sophistic Motakallimin that the proposition about the world's eternity can be proved untrue, he contents himself with the position that it cannot be proved true and thus an opening is left for him to maintain the Jewish belief in God as Creator and at the same time to do no violence to reason and to philosophical demonstration. It is, of course, open to him on this basis to show reasons why the Mosaic doctrine is preferable to the ordinary peripatetic position of an eternal universe, and this he proceeds to do.

There are some general considerations, he tells us, which are in favour of Moses and against Aristotle. For instance, the great variety of sublunary things can be traced to the immutable laws which regulate the influence of the spheres on things below, but it would seem that the variety of the spheres themselves can only be explained by saying that it is the result of God's free will since according to Aristotle himself it is contrary to the laws of nature that a simple being should be the cause of various and compound beings. Then again Aristotle built up his theories upon notions of the heavens which

have been profoundly modified by the more accurate researches of Ptolemy and even Ptolemy leaves much still to seek. This points to the fact that it is impossible to get a perfectly correct doctrine of the heavens, as the Psalmist says "the Heavens are the Lord's," it is only earth about which scientific investigation can be satisfactory, the earth alone "has been given to the children of men." The account of the Creation of the World in Genesis, says Maimonides, is allegorical—God created first the "Reshit," or "beginning," and the Intellects which give to the spheres both existence and motion whereby they become the source of the existence of all that is beneath them. On the Seventh Day the Universe was ruled by the same natural laws that still continue in operation. The personages of the creation story have also allegorical signification, e.g., Cain, Abel and Seth mean the vegetable, animal and intellectual elements in man respectively. First the animal element (Abel) disappears, then the vegetable (Cain) and the intellectual element is left alone (Seth). After this Maimonides goes on to treat of prophecy, a section which is only to our purpose because in it a main interest in the study of Averroism, the Active Intellect, reappears. Prophecy, according to Maimonides, is an emanation which through the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect both to the intellect and to the imagination of properly qualified persons. When this emanation descends upon a human intellect alone, and leaves the imagination untouched, we get a "Wise Man" but not a Prophet. When it affects the imagination alone, the result is Diviners and Dreamers. Only when both are touched is the result a Prophet. Maimonides does not seem to expand his teaching about the Active Intellect. He regards it as the Intelligence of the sublunary sphere and possibly agrees with the Arabians in their teaching about the Unity of the Intellect which was so distasteful to

the Christian Schoolmen. At any rate it is recorded that his enemies brought up this point against him and accused him of denying immortality to man. This seems to be a true accusation as he several times asserts the impermanance of the individual and seems to make no exception in the case of individual men. E.g., in discussing, in a much later chapter, the divine knowledge, he says "God knows that a certain person (yet unborn) is non-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time, will continue to exist for some time and will then cease to exist."[2]

All his polemic, therefore, is reserved for the question of the Creation of the World out of nothing. To repeat, Maimonides' contention is (1) that reason alone is unable to demonstrate Creation out of nothing as the Motakallimin sophistically pretend that it can, and (2) that neither can the eternity of the world be demonstrated by reason as the Arabian peripatetics averred. All the "proofs"—and he enumerates seven of them—of the Motakallimin rest upon a denial of natural causation and are unworthy of serious consideration, but it is a very different matter with the arguments of the philosophers and these are such as to repay detailed examination. Maimonides sets out seven of them also, four which proceed from the world as their starting point and three from the Divine Nature.

The first argument is from the eternal nature of time and movement: we can never reach back to a "first moved." The second argument is from the nature of primal matter. If matter had come to be, it would imply another matter out of which it came to be, it would moreover be endowed with form as a necessity of its coming to be. A formless "first matter" could never come to be. The third argument is drawn from the unopposed motion of the heavens — the circular motion of the heavens has nothing opposed to it, and must be eternal. The

[2] "Guide" Friedländer, pp. 292—293.

last of the arguments drawn from the nature of the world is that of AlFarabi. In all that comes to be the possible must precede the actual in time. The coming to be of the world is either necessary, impossible or possible. If it be necessary, then the world has always existed, if impossible, never. If the generation of the world be possible, then we are bound to think of a substratum which precedes the actual world in time, and to avoid a process "in infinitum" the world must be eternal. The last three arguments of the philosophers in favour of the eternity of the world have God as their starting point. The first tells us that if God had created the world, before the creation He was in a position of possibility to create. By the creation He passed out of possibility or potentiality into actuality—such a passage from power to act implies an Agent already in act, and this in the case of God is absurd. The next argument is that that which is active at one time and quiescent at another, must either be stopped or hindered in its working or must be incited to work. That cannot apply to God, therefore His creation is eternal. The last argument says that all God's works are perfect. His Wisdom is eternal and is identical with His Being—so the world also, being His work, is eternal.[3]

In his refutation of these formidable arguments Maimonides tries to show, as we have already seen, that Aristotle is not responsible for claiming demonstrative force for them. He relies upon an inexact quotation from the "Physics," bk. 8, c. 1. He reads the passage as though Aristotle made Plato say that the heavens are perishable. He also quotes other passages, but to the modern reader, equipped with better texts than were available for an Arabic writer of the twelfth century, there seems little doubt that Aristotle, as was indeed demanded by the principles of his philosophy, held the doctrine of the

[3] Cf. pp. 54—55. Chapter 3.

eternity of matter. As regards the arguments generally, Maimonides' reply is that those which approach the subject from the side of the world judge the beginnings of things by what they find now in the world. From the mere consideration of a man when full grown we could not deduce the semen and ovum out of which the embryo starts its life. "It is impossible to infer," he tells us, "from the nature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages of its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the moment when this process commenced; nor does the condition of a thing in this moment show what its previous condition has been." As regards the proofs which approach the subject from the side of God, he says that it is only in things which are compounded of matter and form that we can speak of a process from power to act. Such things begin to work after a period of not working, but this, according to Maimonides, does not hold of immaterial beings, e.g., of the Active Intellect which does not act continually but only at times. Probably if Maimonides had read what Averroes has to say on this point he would have given more space to the consideration of this argument. Evidence was produced in the last chapter to show that Averroes would certainly not admit the idea of an interruption of the activity of the Active Intellect. It is only the "disposition," or the "passive intellect" in man which is sometimes illuminated by the Active Intellect and at other times not. Averroes' faith is that somewhere there is at all times an human intellect so illuminated. But Maimonides, though he does just notice this in passing, presses the differences between the conditions of working of the Divine Mind and ours. The reader will, however, probably feel that the treatment of these arguments is not among the most satisfactory portions of the "Guide." Whichever way you look at it, it seems impossible really to combine

a doctrine of creation in time with the tenets of the Peripatetic philosophy.

Maimonides throughout, somewhat inconsistently with Aristotelian principles, insists on the Free Will of God which, however, we must not measure by our will. Just as we cannot know the reasons which led Him to create just nine spheres and no more, so we cannot know why He created at a particular time, or waited so long before He created. The diverse movements of the spheres, the incalculable motions of the planets, the difference in size and grouping of the fixed stars all throw us back on the Will of God. They all tend to make improbable the *necessary* world of the Aristotelians. There is, as we saw, no direct proof either way, but the considerations brought forward make it difficult to be satisfied with the theory of the eternity of the universe.

Dr. Anselm Rohner, of Münster, has published a most interesting study[4] on this subject, from which the above abstract of Maimonides' arguments has been largely drawn. He draws a parallel between Maimonides and Albert the Great on the one hand, and Maimonides and S. Thomas Aquinas on the other. Maimonides, he tells us, agrees with Albert in three points: (1) that we know by revelation only that the world has been created; (2) that the Aristotelian proofs for the world's eternity do not reach demonstration and that the teaching of revelation is preferable on philosophical lines; and (3) that such proofs as those of the Motakallimin fail of demonstration in favour of creation. They differ about the possibility of an eternally created world. Albert says that such a world is not possible, but Maimonides will not decide. S. Thomas and Maimonides differ in that S. Thomas holds that we can prove by reason that the world has been created out of nothing (but not that it has been created *in time*), consequently

[4] Das Schöpfungsproblem bei M. Maimonides, Albertus Magnus u. Th. v. Aquin, Münster, 1913.

they differ also about the force of the Aristotelian arguments in favour of a necessary and eternal world. S. Thomas says these arguments are philosophically wrong, Maimonides only that the view imposed upon us by revelation is *better* philosophically. They agree that we only know by revelation that the world has had a beginning *in time*.

This discussion on the eternity of the world is the main philosophical interest of the "Guide." It abounds, however, in many other points of curious learning, strange mixtures of rabbinical comment with scraps of Greek philosophy and natural science. We read of the "music of the spheres," how every herb that grows has its star in heaven, of the "four elements" in the Old Testament—the fire of the heavens is not luminous, therefore Moses calls it "Hoshek"—the word in Hebrew translated "darkness." He tells us in another place that the distance between the earth and Saturn is "a journey of nearly eight thousand seven hundred solar years," reckoning a day's journey as forty miles. Maimonides has a passage on the hierarchy of the sciences—the study of the mathematical sciences and logic is for those who are going round the king's palace in search of the gate. With physics you enter the hall, but when, after completing the study of natural philosophy, you master metaphysics, you have entered the innermost court and are with the king in the same palace. There are, he tells us again, many different degrees of prophecy, from that of a judge or warrior in Israel to Moses who spoke to God face to face. It is noteworthy that he puts books like Proverbs, Chronicles and Daniel in a very low degree of prophecy.

Having thus sketched the main positions of Maimonides, the question arises as to what measure of success he has attained in his endeavour to interpret the Old Testament so as not to contradict Aristotle. It may be admitted at once that his treat-

ment of the Hebrew anthropomorphisms is entirely justified. They belong, on any theory, to the childhood of the race and contain that measure of truth—and it is a large measure—which is the property of the intuitions of childhood. But the serious question in this connexion is whether their truth is consistent with thoroughgoing Aristotelianism. We shall probably not quarrel with Maimonides for holding to the doctrine of creation out of nothing. God, the Old Testament tells us, is a Living God and not an aspect of the world. Impossible as it is to think of Him with the form and passions of a man, yet to think of Him as Personal and Living is nevertheless nearer the truth than were we to envisage Him as a static Perfection careless of what was happening upon earth. The Religion of Judaism—and still more that of Christianity—cannot be satisfied with a Deity drawn on peripatetic lines, an eternal matter and an eternal universe. The more the question is pondered over, the more impossible it seems to get a genuine reconciliation between Aristotelianism and the Bible. In that direction no progress has been made by Maimonides, his objections against the conclusions of the peripatetic philosophers, such as Averroes, are in effect a giving up of peripateticism altogether.

In so far as the Jews' Religion in the course of its historical evolution had come to regard God as Almighty, Infinite and Perfect, it found Aristotle a valuable ally in this field. Yet there are other and not less vital attributes of Deity in the discussion of which Aristotle is a hindrance rather than a help. Maïmonides can make a plausible case only by doing violence to some of the most fundamental principles of the philosophy whose aid he has invoked. For example, the very idea of "creation" does not enter into the Aristotelian framework at all. Aristotle knows four causes and four causes only; no one of the four is, or could be, a *creational* cause. When

it is said that God is the "Efficient Cause" of the world, it is to be remembered that the original idea of an "efficient cause"—what the phrase means, in fact—is a cause *of motion*. The Latin translation, "causa efficiens," somewhat disguises this, but the Greek original, "hóthen he kínesis," is clear. Now "motion" is only the educing from power to act and always and everywhere implies a "matter," with potentialities, to start with. If God is Creator, it is *not* speaking accurately to describe Him in peripatetic phraseology as "Efficient Cause" of the World.

Thus the reader comes to a conclusion that appears inevitable, namely, that only a very small degree of success has attended the efforts of Maimonides to express Judaism in peripatetic terms. There is plenty of juxtaposition, but very little inner unity. He has quite properly and rightly ruled out the anthropomorphisms as a preliminary to a philosophical account of the Divine Nature—we might then be under the impression that the metaphysical categories of the system he champions would meet the case and give us a satisfactory way of thinking about God, but we find that the most characteristic features of the Religion of Israel absolutely refuse to fit these categories at all. Neither mythology nor metaphysics have succeeded in containing that which comes by way of Revelation, which is "Wholly Other," "Mysterium Tremendum et Venerandum."[5]

[5] To make use of the phraseology of Dr. Rudolf Otto ("Das Heilige"), it might be said that Maimonides shares with other typical members of his race a highly developed sense of the "numinous" in nature and in history. He holds also the traditional belief, a possession of the Christian Church as well, that this "numinous" has received expression in the human language of prophets and psalmists which is normative for human minds, or, as we say, "inspired,"—that is to say, not the mere guesses of individuals but communicated from the incomprehensible Source without. But in Its own Essence, that Source remains beyond all our categories and all our imaginings.

CHAPTER V.

ARISTOTLE IN THE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, S. THOMAS AQUINAS.

Aristotelianism, as is well known, penetrated not only Islam and Judaism but also Christianity. Indeed in Christianity it has had its most illustrious career. Among the names of its professors in our Religion there is none more famous than that of S. Thomas Aquinas, and in consequence an attempt will be made in this Chapter to sketch a brief outline of some of the leading characteristics of his thought. To deal with him adequately would require rather a library than a Chapter, so great is the extent of his work and the width of his genius.

The thirteenth century was prodigal in great men but none of its sons outshone S. Thomas in fineness of intellect or beauty of character. He was born in 1227, the son of Laudolf, Count of Aquino. Very early he showed a love of learning and religion that remained with him throughout life. As a boy at Monte Cassino his question was constantly "What is God?" In his sixteenth year he entered religion in the then rising Dominican Order and soon became the pupil of the famous German Doctor, Albert the Great, at Cologne. With this master he went to Paris in 1245, and in 1246 we find him back at Cologne as "magister studiorum," second in command under Albert who was then Regent of the Studium Generale. In 1252 he took his doctor's degree in Paris and in 1269 Part 1 of his greatest work, the "Summa Theologica," appeared. This work, which in a modern edition fills seven closely printed volumes, was left unfinished at the date of his early death in 1274. But he was the author of many other

treatises both long and short, such as the "Summa contra Gentiles," commentaries on Aristotle, on Proclus, and so on. Albert on hearing of his brilliant pupil's death exclaimed that the light of the world had gone out. In 1280 he followed his beloved son to the grave.

Not all would be agreed about the relative importance of the various works of S. Thomas. To call the "Summa Theologica" his greatest work is to follow his disciples of the Dominican Order, but many would grant the first place to his "Summa contra Gentiles," the work in which he recommends a Christian view of philosophical problems to unbelievers. The idea of a Sum of Theology is of respectable antiquity and is historically a development of the Baptismal Formula. The candidate for Baptism was required to know something about the Faith into which he was going to be baptised and it was for his benefit that the first rudimentary "Summae" were compiled—an extant example is found in the Catechetical Orations of S. Cyril of Jerusalem, about 347 A.D. We then get expanded versions of the same kind of thing in such works as the "De Fide et Symbolo," "De Doctrina Christiana" of S. Augustine. Among S. Thomas' immediate predecessors, Peter Lombard (1100—1164 A.D.), the "Master of the Sentences," had written a "Summa" much on the Augustinian lines, as also had S. Thomas' master, Albert. But what all these pre-Thomistic "Summae" lacked was a certain order or architectonic scheme which S. Thomas supplied. This is, indeed, one of the most wonderful parts of his work, namely, his capacity for order, for making a rational and, as it were, natural division of his subject which the reader takes for granted, so natural it is, and does not notice or remark upon the great skill and deep insight needed for its achievement.

When S. Thomas wrote the new Aristotelian metaphysic had been made available for European

thinkers. They had passed beyond the conditions described in the Second Chapter. The old "Platonism," chiefly Logic, had been supplemented from this newer source. Aristotle and Averroes, the great "Commentator," are now well known and it is not the least of the marks of S. Thomas' genius that he was ready to accept whatever in Aristotle might be a bulwark of his Faith, even though it might come to him by way of heterodox Arabs and Jews. Of course as always in such a situation there was considerable opposition among the more straitly orthodox to whom the contributions of Moslem thinkers were anathema.

The nature and scope of S. Thomas' work is best studied in the "Summa Theologica" itself. As already stated, this work was begun in 1269 and left unfinished at the date of the author's death in 1274. It consists of three Parts, of which the First treats of God, His Unity, His Threefold Personality, His Creation, Angels, Men and Things. The Second Part is divided into two sections. It treats of the Way to God, in the first section in general, in the second in particular—what we should now call the science of Ethics. The Third, and unfinished, Part deals with the Incarnation and the Sacraments. Probably this scheme contains an intended analogy with the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity and the Two Natures of the Second Person. It is written in precise and clear Latin and should present no difficulty to a reader who has had an ordinarily good literary education. Its style is not, of course, that of the writers of the age of Augustus Cæsar but if excellence of style means an expression of rational meaning in clear and unambiguous phraseology, then S. Thomas' style ranks very high. The few technical words and expressions are quite easy to understand and the reader soon grows accustomed to them. For those who cannot read Latin at all the English Dominicans have provided a most excellent transla-

tion in English not only of the "Summa Theologica" but of the "Summa contra Gentiles" as well. The latter has also been presented in an English dress some years ago by Fr. J. Rickaby, S.J., in a book called "Of God and His Creatures." It is, however, incomplete and must therefore be used with caution as a presentation of the mind of S. Thomas.

The "Summa Theologica" is on this plan. Each several Part is divided into a number of "Quaestiones" and each "Quaestio" is introduced by a short statement showing the necessity or appropriateness of discussion of that question at that stage and giving a résumé of the Articles into which the Question is to be divided. There are generally at least two, more commonly more, Articles in each Question. But they are all on the same plan, e.g., Question 10 of Part One, "On the eternity of God"—divided into Art. i. What is eternity? Art. ii. Whether God is eternal? Art. iii. Whether to be eternal is proper to God? Art. iv. Whether eternity differs from "aevum" and from time? Art. v. Whether "aevum" be different from time? Art. vi. Whether there is only one "aevum" as there is one time and one eternity? Each Article begins with the statement of one or generally more "Objections," introduced by the words "ad primum (articulum) sic proceditur"—"ad secundum" etc. "Videtur quod" some statement denying the truth enunciated in the title of the article. When all the Objections have been set out, the "Authority" for the thesis defended is given, introduced by the words "sed contra." That is to say, Holy Scripture or the Fathers or Aristotle, Boethius, etc., say so-and-so. After this, S. Thomas gives his own discussion of the point at issue, beginning always with the words "respondeo dicendum." This is commonly called "the body of the Article," sometimes of considerable length, sometimes quite short. Each Article concludes with a detailed reply to each Objection. The point of interest differs very

much from Article to Article, sometimes the interesting thing is the discussion in the "body," at other times the replies to the objections contain the most valuable part of the Article. It is well to observe S. Thomas' use of "authority." As stated above, an "authority" is always quoted immediately after the enunciation of the Objections. But this never prevents the objections being answered always on their merits and the reply is an appeal to reason wherever this is possible, for, obviously, on topics like the nature of Angels or the Blessed Trinity it is out of the question to give a purely philosophical reply to the objicient. The spirit in which the whole Summa is conceived is consistently large and philosophical, there is nothing anywhere petty, or narrow, or mean about it, no attempts to silence an opponent by appeals to sentiment or to prejudice. The objicient's position, again, is always fairly and fully stated. The whole work is a model of courtesy and sincerity. Even now, when so many philosophical fashions have changed, it makes the most favourable impression on the reader. A rational discussion of the problems of the universe could not be conducted upon a higher level.

To come to grips with the Summa, let us examine in detail the famous third Article of the Second Question of Part One. The title of the Question is "De Deo, an sit"—"Of God—whether He exist." The third Article repeats this and asks "Whether there be a God?"

He begins, according to the usual plan, with the objections. No. 1. It seems that God does not exist. God is infinite Goodness, but the existence of one infinite totally destroys the opposite thereto, and there is evil in the world. No. 2. What we can explain by a few principles, we must not explain by many. We can explain the world as it now exists from secondary causes, from nature or human will, so there is no necessity to posit God. But the

Authority of Holy Scripture, in the Book of Exodus, tells us "I am Who am." We then pass to the Body of the Article, with the usual formula "respondeo dicendum"—"I reply that we must say"—and here follow the famous Five Proofs. The first of the five is taken from the idea of motion. Everything that is moved, is moved by something else and motion means to lead a thing out from "power" into "act."[1] Now nothing can be drawn from power to act except by something that is already in act. A piece, say, of metal which is cold in act but hot in power cannot become hot in act except by the agency of something which is already hot in act, e.g., a furnace. It cannot make itself hot in act; nothing can be at the same time the same thing both in power and in act. We cannot contemplate an infinite regress in the matter of motion, since the secondary moving bodies could never begin to move but for the Prime Mover. So we are forced to assume a Prime Mover to account for the actual motions of the present. But a Prime Mover, Who is moved by none, is what all understand by God. The Second Proof is similar, only it rests on the idea of efficient Causation. Nothing is its own efficient cause, for in that case it would be prior to itself. Neither is an infinite regress possible, for in any chain of causes the first cause is cause of the middle member of the chain and the middle member is the cause of the last link of chain. Remove the cause and you therewith remove the effect, so that if there be no first member, there will be no last. If there be no First Efficient Cause of the world, there could be none of the efficient causes we now know. We are therefore compelled to posit a First Efficient Cause, Whom all call God. The Third Argument turns on the possible and the necessary. Certain things in this world before us are subject to generation and decay; it is possible for

[1] See page 54.

them either to be or not to be. Such things cannot always be, for what it is possible not to be, sometimes is not. If therefore everything were of such a nature that it was possible for it not to be, there would be a time when nothing was at all. If, however, that were so, there would be nothing now, since what is not can only come into being through the agency of that which already exists. This is plainly false, so we are forced to posit alongside the possible a Necessary. Here again, for the same reason as in Proof No. 2 we cannot have an infinite regress and so are bound to posit a Necessary Which has Its necessity in Itself and not elsewhere, and is the Cause of necessity in other things. This all men call God. The Fourth Proof is taken from a consideration of Grades of being. We find in things various grades of goodness or of truth or nobility. But such comparative statements demand that which is of highest grade, against which they are measured, more or less. A thing, for example, is hotter and hotter as it approaches the Hottest. So likewise there must be a Truest, a Best, a most Noble, and consequently That Which has the greatest degree of Existence. The truer a thing is, says Aristotle, the more it *is*. And this Greatest is the Cause of all that fall within the genus; as fire, which is hottest, is the cause of all heat. So that Which most *is*, is the cause of Being, and of Goodness and of all Perfection—and this we call God. The Fifth and last Argument is taken from the Governance of the World. We see certain natural bodies bereft of the reasoning faculty which nevertheless act towards a rational End. These actions cannot be accidental but must be reasoned actions, but things bereft of knowledge never act to any end unless they are directed by one possessing knowledge and intelligence as the arrow seeks its end only when transmitted by the hand of the archer. We must therefore posit an Intelligent Being by Whom

all natural things are ordered to their end, and this Being we call God.

This finishes the "Body of the Article" and it remains now for S. Thomas to give short answers to the two objections with which we started, namely, the existence of evil and the sufficiency of secondary causes. To the first he replies with a quotation from S. Augustine to the effect that God, the Highest Goodness, would not allow evil to be unless He were so Almighty and Good that He could even bring good out of the evil. To the second he says that both nature and human intelligence need a First Cause Which is not mobile or liable to defect.

The foregoing is a model of what all the Questions are like. Within the Parts, or greater divisions of the "Summa," the Questions are sometimes grouped under Treatises—for instance, the first 26 Questions form a Treatise on the Being and Unity of God. Question 27 is headed "Tractatus de Trinitate" because from that Question up to and including Question 44 the subject of the Blessed Trinity is discussed. But the following groups of Questions have no special heading, although they form treatises on Creation and, Question 50 onwards, the famous Treatise on the Angels from which S. Thomas gets his title of Doctor Angelicus.

Some general characteristics of S. Thomas' philosophy are at once evident. It is plain that he is what in modern parlance would be called an intellectualist and a realist—the latter term had, by the way, in mediæval times, exactly the opposite meaning to that which we now give to it.[2] To S. Thomas the universe consists of individual objects which are the subject of ratiocination in the minds of men. Reason is the crown and completion of man's nature so far as his activities in regard to the external world are concerned. There are many things, of course, which we are unable to find out

[2] See Chapter 2 *(passim)*.

for ourselves and where we need a Divine Revealer, but in dealing with its own objects, in the world of sense and feeling, reason is supreme. It can envisage the whole universe and can by itself prove the existence and entitative attributes of God. It cannot, however, know the Essence of God and can know Him only in His effects. It would probably be agreed that any optimistic philosophy must be "intellectualist." Such statements as that of Pascal that "the heart has its reasons of which the head knows nothing" are admirable criticisms of a shallow intellectualism but if they are taken beyond their original purpose and twisted into metaphysical maxims they are a delusion. "The mind of man is the candle of the Lord," according to a quotation beloved of the Cambridge Platonists, and, as Hegel said, "the Real is the Rational."

Another great truth which is quite clearly seen by S. Thomas is that of the nature of the good. "There is nothing good in the world," said Kant, "except the good will" and S. Thomas agrees. In the fourth Article of the fifth Question of Pt. 1, he tells us that "we do not call a man good because he has a good intellect, but only when he has a good will."

S. Thomas' fame was immediate. To see the great place he occupied in the mind of the following century it is only necessary to turn to the "Paradiso" of Dante. He has more or less kept that place ever since within the Latin Church. He was not conspicuously honoured in the eighteenth century, but he came into his own again in the nineteenth. In our own day he has inspired the great philosophical activities of the University of Louvain. The approbation set on his work by the authorities of his own Church could not go higher. The "Summa Theologica" was the only book which shared a place of honour with the Holy Scriptures on the Altar during the Vatican Council of 1870, and many of the most

important dogmatic decrees of that Council are taken almost verbatim from S. Thomas' works. These decrees are by no means limited to his theology, his philosophy is almost as authoritative. This becomes even more clear when attention is paid to the papal pronouncements in his regard during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On 4th August, 1879, Pope Leo XIII. issued an Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" making Thomistic philosophy the norm for all schools and colleges subject to him. "The philosophy of S. Thomas," says Pope Leo, "will be the best means of healing the intellectual, social and domestic evils of our time." Still more striking is the Encyclical "Studiorum ducem" issued by the present Pope on 29th June, 1923. This Encyclical speaks of S. Thomas not only as the "Angelic" but as the "Common" or "Universal" Doctor "because his doctrine the Church has made her own." Has any other master, it asks, explained the nature, method and division of philosophy better than he? His words on the power and value of the human mind, it tells us, are authoritative. "Our intellect," it quotes from S. Thomas, "naturally knows being and the things that essentially belong to being, and upon this knowledge the knowledge of first principles is founded." And the Encyclical goes on to comment on this quotation to the effect that it does away, root and branch, with the erroneous opinions of those who hold that, in the act of understanding, it is not being that is perceived but a suggestion or impression of the percipient himself. The arguments, it goes on, that S. Thomas uses to prove the existence of God and to show that He is the One Self-subsisting Being are as valid to-day as they were in the Middle Ages, and the Church's dogma, solemnly defined in the Vatican Council, most clearly confirms them. As Pius X. said, "God, the Beginning and End of all things, can be certainly known by the natural light of reason, through those things which are made,

that is, through the visible works of His creation, as a cause is known by its effects. This can be demonstrated." And although, continues the Encyclical, his metaphysical teachings have aroused the bitterness of hostile critics, yet they still retain their force and splendour like pure gold that no acid can dissolve or tarnish. Quoting Pius X. again, to desert Aquinas in his metaphysical teachings is to risk disaster. Thomas has altogether overthrown the Modernists—and much more to like effect.

The result of these Papal pronouncements has been, as might be anticipated, that Roman Catholic philosophers are practically bound to follow the general lines of Thomistic thought. The fate of Rosmini and others who have tried to strike out new paths is of very unhappy augury for any who might now wish to be their successors. And undoubtedly S. Thomas is a great model to follow. When we consider his position in the age in which he lived, it is clear that he belongs to the great company of the immortals, of those who have a permanent message for mankind. Some further remarks on the question of how far his authority can properly be invoked in certain modern controversies are given in a Note appended to this Chapter.

When we get to the thirteenth century and S. Thomas, we have travelled far indeed from the original Greek Aristotle with his fresh and vigorous outlook upon nature. He was a man of keen powers of observation, he defends no tradition and reveres no authorities. Indeed he indulges freely and often intemperately in the criticism of his predecessors, especially of Plato to whom he is unfair. A writer of this complexion all but invites the reader to criticise him in return.

But in the Middle Ages all this is changed. We have already seen the reverence with which Aristotle is treated by Averroes. The whole tone of Maimonides also is very similar though not, of

course, going to such extreme lengths. The same thing is inherited in S. Thomas. The peripatetic tradition is now something sacrosanct except only on the few occasions upon which it comes into direct conflict with Christian dogma. In this sacrosanctity those who, after Aristotle, have built up the tradition, also share, for example, Boethius who was not a great thinker and, somewhat undeservedly, appeared to the men of the Middle Ages in the guise of a Christian martyr. The result is that what now passed as "Platonism," or "Aristotelianism," has become a frozen tradition, as unlike as possible to the fresh, fluid, inquisitive thought of Plato or Aristotle themselves. As a consequence all the really interesting questions in general metaphysics are treated as "data." A casual remark of Aristotle on any subject becomes a piece of information upon which we may proceed to build. When on occasion it is really necessary to add something fresh or relatively fresh, on any topic, the most meticulous care must be taken to explain that what you now add in no way impugnes what the Master has said. In this way the tradition becomes stifling.

In the last Chapter our discussion on Maimonides came to the conclusion that little or no progress was made by that philosopher in his attempt to reconcile the Actus Purus of the Aristotelian tradition with the Living God of the Religion of Israel. Still more difficult was such a reconciliation with the Christian God of Love. Pure Act obviously cannot love anybody or anything. It is doubtless the Object of the world's love, but quite incapable of returning that love in any conceivable manner. Now, of course, we knew from other sources, for example, his beautiful eucharistic hymns, that S. Thomas was filled with the love of God and habitually thought of God as Himself essentially Love. But no ingenuity can ever fill the chasm between the Pure Act of the philosophical and the Personal Love of the religious

tradition. In the measure that Christianity thought more of God as Living and Loving, the greater is the failure to make any progress towards a philosophical reconciliation with Aristotle.

Or, to take another point where the help to be got from the peripatetic tradition is in appearance only, let us consider the presentation of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Among the less profound, but not on that account less revered, treatises of Aristotle is the one entitled "Categories." These Categories are a list of what are, practically, parts of speech, ten classes of words "predicated in no conjunction" —Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, etc. They form an analysis of the elements of the logical proposition, a classification of terms. Aristotle tells us in another place[3] that the verb "to be" is used "to express as many relations as are formulated in the categories." Probably to Aristotle these categories were not so much the ultimate classes of things as the simplest or first notions of the mind—at any rate he gives us the list of the categories expressly outside the judgement and it is in the judgement that truth first arises. Now the subsequent history of philosophy abundantly shows the very difficult and uncertain problem in metaphysics with which this more or less trivial piece of the game of formal logic is connected. But, of course, the Aristotelian scheme of Categories was taken over entire by the mediæval mind which saw in it a piece of information about the ultimate constitution of the Universe. Boethius, writing in the sixth century, seems to have conceived the idea of applying it to the Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, and it is upon this foundation that S. Thomas builds the whole fabric of his Treatise upon the Three Persons. Thus: in God no category is found save that of Substance, but there are Father, Son and Spirit—Which are obviously concepts falling under the category of

[3] Met. 4, 7.

"relation." Therefore, these relations which subsist in God must themselves be Substance. Of course, the modern reader says at once that a "relation" which is also a "substance" is an impossible conception. The whole meaning of "relation" is that it signifies the mode of being of one substance compared with another. The result, therefore, of the whole discussion is no more than a statement that the mode of being of the Persons in the Godhead is an unexplained Mystery, exactly what we knew to start with; our excursion into formal logic has added just simply nothing to our thought.

It is not, therefore, in the opinion of the present writer in these applications of Aristotle to the New Testament that the real greatness of S. Thomas must be sought. Such an attempt to combine peripateticism and religion has already broken down in Maimonides. S. Thomas must be read strictly as a writer of his own age and milieu. In that case his fearless love of truth, his diligence, his fairness in stating the views of his opponents, his readiness to learn from all will endear him to every reader of good will and make him serve as a model for all time of the highest qualities of a disputant. And he must be read as a Christian Doctor upon whose every sentence lies the impress of the love of God and of the deepest devotion to Christ. Often and often in the midst of these arid and old-world arguments the page will scintillate with thoughts of beauty and with flashes of mystic insight. As such he is indeed a permanent possession of the Church on earth.

NOTE A.

S. THOMAS AND SOME MODERN CONTROVERSIES.

As indicated in the last Chapter, the Aristotelian tradition in its Thomistic form is put forward in certain quarters as a guide in the difficult questions raised by some modern controversies. The Papal Encyclical, for example, quoted on p. 89, refers to S. Thomas as "having overthrown the modernists" and as "delivering on biblical matters the genuine notion of Divine Inspiration." These are surprising statements, for it would seem "prima facie" absurd to appeal to the pre-Copernican and pre-Kantian thirteenth century for help in such essentially modern problems as these. No doubt there were analogous problems when S. Thomas wrote, but the main difficulties of the present day arise out of an accumulation of facts, all of which were practically unknown before a quite recent past.

We shall have, it may be allowed, no hesitation in seeing in S. Thomas a model for all time in his fundamental love of truth and his belief that it will prevail, as also in his scrupulous care to represent his adversaries fairly and fully. Would that all controversialists of our time followed him here! But when we pass from such considerations as these it becomes increasing difficult to see what special help we are likely to get from him. Thomism is a strange amalgam of Aristotle and Christian doctrine in which these two elements appear side by side without ever attaining to an inner unity. But even if a systematic and thoroughly consistent metaphysic were to be found in S. Thomas, it would seem quite useless as regards the real "crux" of the present-day problem. It does not take a very wide reading

to see that what is called "modernism" in, say, its French or Italian form, does not obtain such driving force as it has from any *philosophy*. Its "vitalistic," or "immanentist" theories, of which so much was made in the Encyclical "Pascendi" of 1907 are, so far as they exist at all, wholly secondary. The main point is the compatibility of new knowledge, in natural science, in historical criticism and so on, with traditional beliefs. It seems worse than useless to answer such difficulties by a reference to the wholly different mind of the thirteenth century.

To take a special problem, nothing has caused more difficulty to Christian scholars than the question of the knowledge of Christ in the days of His Flesh. How far was He made like unto us in *growth* of knowledge? What did He think about the traditional dates and ascriptions of authorship of the Sacred Books of His nation? Now when we turn to the place in S. Thomas where he discusses this question ("Summa Theologica," Pt. III., Qu. 9 et seq.) we find ourselves in a land altogether remote from our modern questionings. S. Thomas tells us that the Human Soul of Christ was possessed of four species of Knowledge, as God He had the Divine Knowledge, and also the Knowledge of the Blessed, the Infused Knowledge and Acquired human knowledge. The Divine Knowledge, however, is part or aspect of the Divine Essence and must therefore be altogether "in act," so the modern reader would conclude at once that any discussion on the other kinds of knowledge, also present, must be superfluous and that in virtue of the Divine Knowledge the Human Soul of Christ knew all things as God. Scholastics naturally lay stress now-a-days on the "acquired knowledge," but if there is Unity of Person this seems useless—when the sun is shining we do not want a candle. Of course S. Thomas does not feel our difficulties, they were not above the horizon of his day.

Or again in the discussion on the Will of Christ, a modern reader, whose psychology is based on the unity of the thinking and willing subject, must decide in favour of "the heretic Severus" every time (Pt. III., Qu. 18—19). There seems to be a confusion between "person" and "thing"—"will," that is to say, the person willing, is treated as an instrument. The whole atmosphere is of the past. It would hardly be a promising undertaking to try to meet the psychological difficulties raised by "modernists" on these lines.

The statement that "S. Thomas delivers the genuine notion of Divine Inspiration" seems, if anything, more dubious still. It is comparatively easy to deduce from general assumptions what the Holy Ghost "must have done" and to conclude sweepingly about the absence of error from His work. But the difficulties in the "notion of Inspiration" are untouched by such methods. Our task is to take the text as it stands and examine it in the light of the best knowledge we have—from such an examination, honestly and fearlessly carried out, we shall learn more about inspiration than any deductive syllogisms can teach us. And the general notion at which we arrive will be conditioned by what we have learned in the course of our examination. Considerable doubt is raised about S. Thomas' ability to help us in any degree whatever on this question in a Lecture by one of his modern disciples. Fr. Pope, in "S. Thomas as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture" ("Aquinas Sexcentenary Lectures") tells us that we are not "to look to S. Thomas for a discussion of the text," that he was "content with the official text" and, moreover, that "unfortunately it was a bad text." Nor, we may add, did he suspect, as Roger Bacon did, that the Vulgate was, at its best, far from being a reliable version of the original writings. Again, to give "the true notion of Divine Inspiration" in any sense save a purely schematic and

formal one, it is surely necessary to know the two languages, Hebrew and Greek, at least. It is not suggested that S. Thomas knew Hebrew and the extent of his acquaintance with Greek seems, to judge from the Lecture quoted above, very problematical. We are told on the one hand that "Greek was not a familiar vehicle for his thoughts" and that "he could at least have spelled out" passages in the Greek Fathers. On the other hand we are assured that "he used Aristotle in Greek perhaps quite as freely as in Latin." These statements seem difficult to reconcile as all will agree who have ever read Aristotle and patristic Greek respectively.[1]

NOTE B.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "RATIONES REALES" AND "RELATIONES RATIONIS" IN S. THOMAS.

(By the late Mr. Arthur Boutwood.)

The idea seems to be that one person or thing might produce another, or act upon another and remain itself unaffected. Consequently the world has a "real" relation to God, since it owes its being to Him, but God does not stand in any "real" relation to the world.

[1] An amusing example of S. Thomas' Greek is given on p. 128 of Mr. R. St. John Parry's recently published memoir of the late Professor Henry Jackson. S. Thomas is commenting upon Book 6, c. 14, of the Nicomachean ethics—"cheîron dè ho apeschediasménos (nómos)" and says: "alias vero dicitur lex aposchediasmenos, ab 'a,' quod est 'sine' et 'poschedias' quod est 'scientia,' et 'menos' quod est 'perscrutatio' quasi lex posita sine perscrutatione scientiae, vel 'schedos' quod dicitur 'dictamen ex improviso editum,' inde 'schediazo,' i.e., 'ex improviso aliquid facio,' unde potest dici 'lex aposchediasmenos,' id est, quae caret debita providentia."

"This seems to show," remarks Professor Jackson, "that whilst he had beside him people that knew Greek, he himself had no real knowledge of it."

A is in "real" relation with B if the existence of A or of something in A depends upon B. Take the case of God and the world. The world depends, for its very existence, upon God, but nothing in God is dependent upon the existence of the world.

God, a Thomist would say, is Perfect Being completely *in act*, and He is that eternally,—timelessly. His actions do not change Him or make any difference in Him. Therefore, it is said, His relation to the world is merely "relatio rationis." The world's relation to Him, however, is a *real* relation.

The difference depends upon the doctrine that the Divine Nature is completely *in act*. Such a nature *cannot* change,—cannot in any way or particular become *novel*, for it has no potency which could become actual in novelty. In every other nature, however, there is something potential. If, in any particular case, action educes potency into act, the nature of the agent is changed—it differs from its own state prior to the action. In such a case the relation established by the action is a *real* relation, for—after the action—there is something in the agent which may be said to depend upon the factual term of its action. God's action never brings about such a dependence.

In modern philosophy, all relations are *real* relations, because in modern philosophy there is nothing which is completely *in act*, not even the Absolute.

NOTE C.

VARIOUS THOMISTIC ARGUMENTS.

(By the late Mr. Arthur Boutwood.)

(1.) The Relations which subsist in God must be Substances.

If it be true that in God there are none of the categories except that of substance, the Relations which subsist in Him must fall within that category.

This does not seem unintelligible. If those Relations fall not within the category of substance, they must be accidents. In God, however, there are not, and cannot be, any accidents. Accidents connote contingency, and contingency denotes the possibility of being something else. But God cannot be other than He is. Nothing in the Divine Nature is contingent and in it there is no unactualised possibility (so, at least, S. Thomas says). *All is Substance.* Qualities which are accidents in man, are substantial in God. Relations are in the same case. Filiation is the very substance of the Son. That, I think, is orthodox Greek theology and sound Thomism. (It were wholly wrong to suppose that the substantial relation of Thomism is a substance interposed between related terms.)

(2.) The Five Proofs of Theism.

(1.) The Prime Mover. For S. Thomas, motion was an *accidental* state—an accidental state brought about by something extrinsic. If that pre-conception be valid, his argument is valid—valid, that is to say, as a demonstration of a Prime Mover. To-day, however, the idea of inert matter has been abandoned in physical science. It were an exaggeration to say, as some do, that *matter* has been resolved into *energy*. But there can be no doubt that, for the physical science of to-day, the ultimate physical reality is *essentially* energetic. Its energy seems to be as substantial as are the moral qualities in God. S. Thomas' pre-conception has been swept away.

(Perhaps it will be said that there still remains the distinction between "substance" and "energy." The distinction does remain, but it is a distinction between inseparables.)

(2.) The First Cause. There seems to be no reason for rejecting "eternal regression" except the one which arises out of the dependence of "duration"

upon "timelessness." That reason, however, S. Thomas did not envisage.

If, however, we add to "eternal regression" contingency, we find ourselves face to face with the impossible. It seems that there cannot be eternal contingency.

This consideration, however, is not an argument for a First Cause, it is an argument for Necessary Being.

If the Time-series be a substantial character of Necessary Being the eternity of it—backwards or forwards—would not be a difficulty for thought. If *energetic substance* were Necessary Being, causation therein would not presuppose a First Cause.

(3.) Necessary Being. There cannot be universal contingency. We are compelled to infer Necessary Being. But is Necessary Being *God?* The Absolute of modern Idealism and Spinoza's Substance both have the note of *necessity* but neither is *God*.

(4.) Grades of Being. This looks like a piece of Platonist Realism. The mere fact that actual being has grades is no evidence that the highest Grade—the Grade of Perfection—exists (except in thought).

No doubt if it could be shown that what we call "incompleteness" were inconsistent with Necessary Being, the existence of what we call "incompleteness" would indicate the actual existence of *completeness*. But can that be shown? Not all modern thinkers who have dealt with the gradation of Reality have felt bound to infer that Most Perfect Being exists. The mere existence of the Hegelian Left is, "prima facie," evidence against S. Thomas.

(5.) The Rational Ends of the Irrational. Would not an implicit rationality serve S. Thomas' immediate purpose just as well as a Reason acting *ab extra?* An "implicit rationality" is not the same as an "implicit mind."

Let it be granted that the nature of "Nature" is not an irrational surd. To explain its "rational

ends" do we need to invoke a supplementary Reason?

(3.) The Problem of Evil.

Upon the Problem of Evil I see no light but this. If the Christian did not know evil in himself and recognise it in others, his compassion, his zeal, his love for Christ would be poorer things than they are, or should be. That would have consequences which would be important, for they would amount to a declension from what is now the Christian norm. Evil is a temporal and indispensable condition of man's external Highest. I cannot help feeling that the Augustinian dictum ("God, the Highest Goodness, would not allow evil to be unless He were so Almighty and Good that He could bring good out of the evil") is a little *naïve*.

(4.) The Universal Aspiration.

The universal movement, we have been told, is the aspiration of Nature towards its Perfection. In its poetical form that doctrine shows us a God Who *evokes* love, but in no form does it show us—in no form can it show us—a God Who *loves*.

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Printed in Great Britain by The Faith Press, Ltd., Leighton Buzzard.